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INTRODUCTION

Innovation today is characterized by diverse forms of collaboration, multidisciplinary problem solving, interconnected
technologies, and complex products incorporating multiple inventions. The patent system must adapt to these changes.1
Faced with increasingly urgent demands for innovation to
solve economic troubles and address natural and man-made
crises, the Obama Administration has made national innova-

1. Patent Reform in 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 176 (2009)
[hereinafter Kappos Testimony] (testimony of David J. Kappos, VP & Asst. GC
IP
Law
&
Strategy,
IBM
Corp.)
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/09-03-10Kappostestimony.pdf.
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tion strategy central to its platform for change.2 Organizational
innovation is a key part of this national strategy.3 But despite
the repeated mention of patent reform as part of the national
innovation strategy, discussions about patents continue to be
marginalized by government decision-makers in their decisions
about how to change the organization of economic activities to
improve innovation outcomes.4 Moreover, while the prolonged
debates about patent reform offered ample opportunity for
lawmakers to tie changes to patent law to broader innovation
goals, patent reforms that respond directly to innovation objectives are notably absent from the recently enacted Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act.5
I argue that this disconnect between government policies
focused on the “organization” of innovation, on the one hand,
and patent policies focused on returns to innovators and the
costs of patent “monopolies” on the other, is symptomatic of
broader problems with the design of patent policy.6 Despite
2. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION:
DRIVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND QUALITY JOBS (2009), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmerican
Innovation/.
3. Strategies for enhancing U.S. competitiveness include regional clustering, new modes of public-private partnerships, removing barriers to the
formation of new businesses, and other efforts to support desired forms of economic organization. See Startup America: Obama Administration Comments,
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america-public#4
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (discussing initiatives designed to spur new forms
of collaboration and to support entrepreneurship).
4. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 15 (providing an overview
of the national innovation strategy and including the patent system to provide
higher patent quality, faster processing, and more transparency in the patent
process).
5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub.L. 112–29 NO.112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011). Complaints about the patent system have focused primarily
on patent quality, delay in processing patents, and the cost of litigation. E.g.,
Julie A. Hedlund, Patents Pending: Patent Reform for the Innovation Economy,
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., May 2007, available at
http://www.itif.org/files/PatentsPending.pdf. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act responded to some of these concerns, although the jury is still out on
the effectiveness of these changes. Significant changes include a switch from a
“first to invent” to a “first to file” system and elimination of interference proceedings, eliminating the best mode requirement, limiting false marking suits,
expanding prior user rights, and the development of new post-grant opposition
proceedings. But the changes do little if anything to change the direction of
patent policy.
6. In talking about “patent policy” I am using the term loosely to encompass decisions made by legislators, agencies such as the USPTO, DOJ and
FTC, and, to a lesser extent, courts, about the objectives of patent law and the
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decades of study and debate we remain largely in the dark as to
how, and in what ways, patents change behavior. The absence
of definitive conclusions about whether and how patents improve or impede innovation makes it difficult to overcome the
political constraints on effective change.7 As a result, opportunities to facilitate different processes of innovation through patent law change continue to be missed.8
In this Article, I argue that patent policy-makers have
been looking in the wrong direction in their efforts to improve
both the functioning and the relevance of the patent system.
They have focused too much on using patents to address presumed sources of general market failure in otherwise competitive markets, taking the structure of economic activities as given and essentially ignoring the effects of patents on economic
organization.9 I argue that policy-makers should instead be focusing on the ways in which patents impact the organization of
ways in which patent laws should be interpreted, applied, and changed in
light of those objectives.
7. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1348–90 (2009) (examining the political
process that shapes patent law change, including the different interest groups
and their respective abilities to influence patent legislation); Robert W. Hahn,
The Economics of Patent Protection: Policy Implications from the Literature 6–
14 (Oct. 2003) (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, unpublished
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=467489 (to access article,
select One-Click Download).
8. As already noted, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act is notable for
the changes it does not make to the patent system rather than for the changes
that it does make.
9. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,
343–44 (2010) (arguing that much of existing patent law can be explained in
terms of efforts to provide ex ante incentives to invent, ignoring the problems
involved with downstream commercialization). The importance of patents as
tools supporting the organization of innovation is becoming the subject of increasing attention in the patent literature, beginning with the early work of
Kitch and his prospect theory but expanding beyond to explore other ways in
which patents shape or hinder the organization of economic activities. Examples include, without limitation: Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the
Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory
of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property
& Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, (2006); Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1857 (2000); and Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of
Organization (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C10-10, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623565 (to access article, select One-Click Download).
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innovation processes and the functioning of markets for innovation.10 I suggest that this change in the orientation of patent
policy is essential in order to improve the relevance of patents
for innovation policy, and I describe what an alternative organizational approach to the design of patent law might look like.
The organizational approach to patent law that I describe
draws from tools and methodologies of New Institutional Economics (NIE) that have become influential in reshaping how
other disciplines, including economics, sociology and history,
approach the regulation of economic behavior. In particular, my
approach applies to patent law key insights from Nobel-prize
winners Oliver E. Williamson on the organization of economic
behavior in the face of imperfect information and opportunism,
and Douglass C. North on limited institutional capacities and
the political economy of institutional change. I argue that Williamson’s perspective on the regulation of economic behavior in
the face of bounded rationality and opportunism has particular
relevance for the analysis of those human arrangements supporting innovation. The problems of imperfect and asymmetric
information, opportunism, and appropriability that drive Williamson’s approach are inherent in the process of innovation, as
amply illustrated by current concerns over the “valley of death”
for cutting age discoveries and complaints about patent trolling
and patent hold-up problems as stifling innovation. Williamson
offers an implementation of these concepts that can be readily
generalized to patents and economic organization.11 North’s in10. Examples of how patents alter the organization of innovation include
work by Jonathan Barnett on intellectual property as the law of organization.
See, e.g., Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9.
Barnett focuses on the role of patents in enabling firms to make efficient decisions about firm scope, facilitating disintegration where there are benefits
from specialization. Id. This paper pursues the same line of reasoning that
Barnett offers, but pushes the analysis to a more foundational level. I argue
that the transactional effects of patent law should be at the center of patent
policy, and I pursue the implications of this view for the design of patent law.
Cf. Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stem, Is There a Market for Ideas? (2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334882 (to
access article, select One-Click Download) (examining conditions under which
a market for technology or ideas will emerge and operate efficiently).
11. Indeed, many of the existing applications of NIE to patents borrow
from Williamson’s approach. See F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
REGULATING INOVATION 416 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds.,
2011). See generally Barnett, supra note 9 (focusing on patents as facilitating
vertical disintegration); Heald, supra note 9 (demonstrating the transaction
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sights on the limitations of institutional capacity and the political economy of rule design are also essential in the design of effective patent policy.12 Any possibilities for patent law change
must be examined in light of the characteristics, entrenched interests and past practices of those making and implementing
patent laws.13 Thus, for example, the competing and complementary interests of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), Congress and the courts become important
factors in policy design.14
Under the organizational approach, transactions, rather
than inventions, are the basic units of analysis. By making this
switch in the starting point for analysis, patent policy-makers
redirect their attention away from individual incentives to invent and towards supporting productive relationships between
participants in alternative processes of innovation. Innovation
here is to be construed broadly, including not only invention,
but also development, new ways of deploying existing technologies, commercialization, adoption, and use.15 Policy-makers are
asked to examine patent laws from within the existing system
of formal and informal rules that determine the cost and feasibility of alternative paths for producing and using innovation.
Patents can modify this institutional environment by changing
the decisions that economic actors make about whether and
how to participate in processes of innovation and markets for
innovation. Examples include decisions about specialization,
vertical integration, and the sustainability of different forms of
cooperation and collaboration.16 This approach can be used to
move closer to the real world picture of how patents impact becost approach).
12. See Douglass C. North, New Institutional Economics and Development
1 (1993) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www2.econ.
iastate.edu/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf .
13. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, 1357–66.
14. Jonathan Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 278–79
(2010) (arguing for institutional solutions to patent performance, advocating
transfer of substantive rule making authority to the USPTO).
15. Christopher T. Hill, The Post-Scientific Society, ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH., Fall 2007, at 79 (argues that the most significant innovations now
come from the novel organization of economic activity); Robert P. Merges, A
Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1514–15
(2005) (argues that property’s “transactional” role is an increasingly important
part of the economy).
16. The existing patent literature includes many examples of how patents
inform these kinds of decisions. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9.
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havior in a way that can inform effective rule design.17
Adopting this way of thinking about patent law can improve policy decisions in significant ways. First, if patent policy
is specifically designed to respond to flaws in human decision
making, such as limited information and opportunism, it will
be more robust in addressing these flaws. By placing decisionmakers at the center of the analysis and recognizing the different mechanisms through which rules both influence and are influenced by human behavior, this approach can identify and
encompass a broader range of functions for patents, including
those often overlooked or ignored.18
Second, the organizational approach focuses specifically on
how to align patent policy more closely with broader innovation
goals.19 By providing a commonality of purpose, that of using
economic organization to increase innovation, this approach
provides a way of mapping patent policy more readily into the
areas of concern in national innovation policy.20 For example,
patent laws can be evaluated to determine whether they facilitate or hinder clustering, public-private partnerships, and other types of arrangements that are the focus of current national
innovation strategies. Moreover, once the value of patents to
national innovation objectives can be demonstrated, political
17. The dangers of including too much, as opposed to too little, context in
the analysis of legal rules is clear. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829,
838–39 (2003) (arguing that the economic analysis of contract law fails because of its indeterminacy). New Institutional Economics has been relatively
successful in the development of analytical tools that capture and examine
empirical regularities, moving between observation and abstraction.
18. Examples include transformative effects on potential entrepreneurs
and expressive functions that reflect and encourage norms of information
sharing or retention. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents,
84 WASH. U. L. Rev. 573, 575–76 (2006).
19. Ted Sichelman makes the interesting point that the current system of
private law damages for patent infringement is inconsistent with a public law
goal of using patents to increase innovation. He argues that patent law remedies should be designed to promote the types of levels of innovation that are
most beneficial to society instead of being used to compensate for private
wrongs inflicted on private parties. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of
Private Law Remedies, 4–5 (2011) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Ted%20Si
cheman%20%20Purging%20Patent%20Law%20of%20Private%20Law%20Rem
edies.pdf. I also argue that patent law should be designed in light of innovation outcomes, and suggest that one way to do this is to make the organization
of innovation the central focus of patent policy.
20. See Barnett, supra note 9; see also Robert P. Merges, supra note 15, at
1516.
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barriers to the integration of patent policy will be easier to
overcome.
Third, the approach provides a platform for integrating
many current patent law theories and related proposals for patent reform into a form that can lead to more definite policy
guidelines.21 It offers a starting point for gathering the insights
that integrating existing work relating to patents and economic
organization within a single framework can yield. The approach can be used to integrate and build on seemingly different and even conflicting patent law theories which, in some
cases, are simply different and interrelated aspects of the same
kinds of behavior. For example, proposals to use patent reform
to reduce transaction costs need to be examined in connection
with studies of alternative private market adjustments to avoid
the same transaction costs and studies which point to different
types and reasons for transaction costs. Proposals for industry
tailoring can be evaluated in terms of how closely differences in
the needs of distinct innovation processes correlate with industry differences.22 This approach also provides a basis for selecting among and refining patent reform proposals.23
Fourth, the organizational approach explicitly takes into
account the bounded information processing and analytic capacities of rulemakers, as well as those subject to the rules, and
incorporates the political economy of rulemaking and enforce21. Economist Jaffe concludes that “robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy
are few” because other factors drive innovation. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29
RES. POL’Y 531, 531 (2000). Hahn similarly concludes that “[t]he most general
lesson to be gleaned from the patent literature is that there are few general
lessons.” Hahn, supra note 7, at ii. This paper lays the groundwork for a larger
project that involves exploring how different pieces of the literature on patents
and economic organization can be integrated as part of a broader theory of patents and the patent system.
22. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 156–57
(2008) (describing industry difference in litigation-based enforcement); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Policy, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1576–78 (2003).
23. See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About
the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1032 (1998) (suggesting the need to sort out the context of innovation presumed in different
theories and to map out the empirical domains where the different theories
are relevant); see also Heald, supra note 9, at 473 (discussing the predominate
view of patent law in an effort to push beyond it).
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ment into the design of reform strategies.24 It can be used to
evaluate divergent opinions on what the process of change
should look like, in particular whether courts, legislators, or a
USPTO with expanded lawmaking authority should take a
leading role in changing the direction of patent law.25
Part I of this Article explores the limits of the traditional
law and economics approach to patent law and the implications
of these limits for current patent policy design. Part II provides
a brief background on NIE and explains how the tools and
methodologies of NIE can be used to address the limitations of
traditional patent law approaches to innovation and patent reform.26 Part III describes the proposed organizational approach
to patent law, outlining the methodology and providing a
framework to guide its application to the strategic design of patent law. Under the organizational approach the focal points of
patent policy design become developing patent laws that are:
(1) responsive to the needs of alternative innovation processes
and the different motivations of entrepreneurs; (2) designed to
reduce the propensity for behaviors which are most costly to
the organization of economic activities (i.e. those behaviors involving defection from agreed upon norms or rules of behavior);
and (3) robust to constraints on rule design and implementation and sensitive to alternative mechanisms for regulating behavior. Part IV illustrates how the organizational approach can
be used to inform the design of patent law in response to contemporary challenges facing the current patent system. This
Article concludes that adopting an organizational approach to

24. Some reform proposals focus solely on the administration of patent
law rather than the substance of the rules; they examine the comparative
strengths and limits of alternative rule making processes. See e.g,. Michael J.
Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1758–61 (2011) (examining the problem of patent reform as a problem of effective administration
and advocating for greater rulemaking authority).
25. See, generally, DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS
AND HOW COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 95–108 (2009); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti
K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 32–54 (2008).
26. See generally, Douglass C. North, A Recommendation on How to Intelligently Approach Emerging Problems in Intellectual Property Systems, 5 REV.
L. & ECON. 1131 (2009) (discussing the role of NIE in helping to develop a
more effective, responsive system of regulating innovation). The existing patent literature includes a number of existing applications of NIE to patent law,
and one benefit of the organizational approach is its ability to integrate these
contributions in a way which yields new insights into how patent policy should
be changed.
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patent policy is essential in the design of a more effective, and
relevant, patent system.27
I. THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND OF TRADITIONAL
APPROACHES AND WHY THEY MATTER
The Constitution, from which U.S. patent law derives, presupposes that patents can increase innovation for the public
good.28 Resting on this foundation, the traditional justification
for the patent regime in the United States has been largely a
utilitarian one based on the public goods aspect of invention.29
Patent policy has been dominated by economic models which
focus on the incentive effects of creating property rights around
intangibles within a market-based economy.30 Alternative justifications, including natural rights theories of property, have
been relegated to the side lines.31 While a number of different
non-incentive models of patents have been explored, as further
discussed in Part II, these models have remained relatively isolated and disconnected from mainstream policy agendas.32 Part
I provides a brief summary of the mainstream approaches and
highlights the ways in which their limiting assumptions constrain effective patent policy design.

27. This paper provides the methodological foundation for a larger project
that examines how patents function as tools for organizing innovation. Adopting an organization based approach to patents and innovation along the lines
that I suggest here offers a promising way of uncovering how patent policy
should respond to contemporary changes in the innovation landscape such as
the increasing volume and complexity of public-private partnerships and other
forms of collaboration, patent pooling, and standard setting.
28. In Article I, Section 8, the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
29. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/
1600book.pdf (noting the dominance of the principal theoretical theory of utilitarianism in justifying protection of technical inventions).
30. Kieff, supra note 9, 398–406 (summarizing the conventional majority
view on intellectual property regimes).
31. But see E. Richard Gold, The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional
Competence, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 263, 265–267 (2003) (arguing that
there is an increasing strain of libertarian theory in U.S. patent law, with its
roots in natural rights).
32. E.g., Heald, supra note 9 (discussing non-incentive based models of
patents and providing a non-incentive based justification for patents).
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A. MAINSTREAM THEORIES OF PATENTS
The dominant theory underlying much of today’s patent
law and policy is the “reward theory” of patenting.33 At its most
basic, this theory explains that patents provide necessary incentives for invention by allowing inventors to appropriate the
returns from their efforts at the cost of restricting use of the resulting inventions.34 The “reward theory” is supplemented by
the “disclosure theory” of patenting, which suggests that by
providing property rights in discoveries to inventors, patents
will allow inventors to disclose their information without fear
that the benefits of the information will be appropriated.35
Recognizing the importance of downstream investments in
exploiting new inventions, a second main branch of theories
has focused on the functions of patents in providing incentives
for the development and commercialization of inventions. This
branch includes Edmund W. Kitch’s well known “prospect theory,” which examines the role of broad, strong patent property
rights in ensuring efficient investment in and management of
downstream innovation.36 Other approaches focus more specifically on the need to induce the development and commercialization of early stage inventions where much of the investment
and problems of appropriability occur after the initial discovery
has taken place and are undertaken by different organizations.37
These mainstream theories of patents diverge in their concern for upstream investment versus downstream development
of the invention, and in the types of market failure that justify
the need for patent rights. But they share a similar starting
33. Kieff, supra note 9, at 398–406.
34. Without patents—or so the incentive theory of patents goes—either
the invention would be kept as a trade secret, limiting access to the idea, or
others would be able to freely copy and use the inventions at lower cost, resulting in an under-supply of inventions and follow on innovation.
35. According to Kieff, conventional views of patents are largely based on
three dominant incentive theories of IP: (1) some version of the “incentive to
invent” and “disclose” theories treated together under the rubric of “reward,”
(2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory. Kieff, supra
note 9, at 398–406; see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989) (discussing alternative theories).
36. For further explanation of the prospect theory, see Edmund Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). According to prospect theory, strong patent rights protect the incentives of the
invention owner to make investments that maximize the value of the patent.
37. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 23, at 1040.
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point based on an abstract and relatively homogenous marketbased paradigm of invention populated by rational actors who
produce invention products. Moreover, the focus remains on
whether monopoly via patent rights is required to address
market failure due to appropriability, uncertainty, or increasing returns to scale,38 and whether it is required at the point of
invention or in the subsequent path of development and commercialization.39 This shared foundation and the assumptions
on which it rests have important consequences for the current
approach to patent policy. One of the main results is a neglect
of the importance that organization plays in innovation outcomes.
B. SHARED LIMITATIONS OF THE MAINSTREAM THEORIES
Three shared assumptions inherent in traditional approaches to patent law account for their limited ability to explain when and how patents influence innovation in reality: (1)
reliance on a simplified world of rational actors; (2) use of perfect competition as a benchmark against which to evaluate policy alternatives; and (3) reliance on an abstract, mass market
production model of innovation.
1. The Simplified Story of Market Failure in a World of
Rational Actors
Traditional theories of patents operate in a world of competitive markets and rational actors, allowing their proponents
to stick to relatively narrow market failure stories of invention
in input and product markets.40 While these theories rely on
stories about how patents change the behavior of inventors, restrictive assumptions of perfect rationality assume away characteristics of human decision-makers that affect how patents
38. See KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION
RESOURCES
FOR
INNOVATION
(1959),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P1856.pdf.
39. See e.g., Ted M. Sichelman, Markets for Patent Scope, 1 IP THEORY 42
(2010) (arguing that divergent views of patent scope can be explained in terms
of divergent views about how well markets for R&D and commercialization
work).
40. Arrow argues that there are three main sources of market failure in
the competitive market paradigm, increasing returns to scale,
inappropriability, and uncertainty, and that all three are present in markets
for information. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, supra note 38, at 10.
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might actually alter behavior. In doing so, they largely ignore
the different mechanisms by which patents may alter behavior
in the production and use of innovation.41
2. Perfect Competition as a Benchmark
A second limitation is the benchmark used by traditional
theories for evaluating rule change. In evaluating the impact of
patents, a model of perfect competition serves as the benchmark against which other forms of market activity can be compared and the efficiency costs of departure from perfect competition identified. This use of a perfect world as a benchmark for
comparing alternative policies limits the scope for incremental
improvement and excludes considerations of feasibility in policy
design. As Ronald Coase warns,
[c]ontemplation of an optimal system may . . . provide techniques of
analysis that would otherwise have been missed. . . . But in general
its influence has been pernicious. It has directed economists’ attention
away from the main question, which is how alternative arrangements
will actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive conclusions for economic policy from a study of an abstract model of a market situation. . . . Until we realize that we are choosing between social
arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to
make much headway.42

Recent efforts to look at patent law in the context of imperfect competition move in the right direction,43 but it is clear
that a more comprehensive shift in the benchmarks used for
comparing policy choices is needed. Part of this shift should in41. See, e.g., James Anton & Dennis Yao, Expropriation and Inventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190
(1994) (examining the role of patents in enabling trade in technological information); Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 237, 238 (1985) (“[B]y protecting property rights, patents here open the market for trade in technological information.”); Robert P.
Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost
of Commercial Exchange, 93 MICH. L. REV.1570, 1590–91 (1995) (discussing
how IP rights can reduce transaction costs).
42. Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. ECON.
REV. 194, 195 (1964).
43. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface
(U. Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-46, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287628 (to access article, select One-Click Download) (stressing the importance of evaluating IP laws within specific market
contexts); Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW J.
L. & TRADE AM. 237 (2007) (arguing for the importance of evaluating rules
such as private property orderings within their market context and using different forms of regulation to ensure the competition needed to make the rules
effective).
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clude incorporating limits in the process for effecting legal
change, since the goal should be to compare feasible policy options.
3. Homogenous Processes of Innovation
Mainstream theories of patent law generally presume a
paradigm of innovation based on a uniform “innovation production” process driven by rational actors responding to market incentives. This view of innovation, what one scholar has termed
a “mass market seller-based” paradigm of innovation, flows
naturally from the neoclassical market-based approach to patents and shares its limitations.44 It leaves no room for differences in the processes by which innovation may take place, the
nature and implications of the resulting innovations, and the
different stages of development in the innovation life cycle.45 As
a result, very different types of economic activities and arrangements are lumped together.46 The means and the processes of innovation are often collapsed with the end, the resulting
innovation and its effects.47 Inventive efforts are viewed as fungible, and the benefits of the incentives provided by patents are
characterized primarily in terms of increased innovation output.48 There is no room in such an approach for puzzling over
how to respond to the problems that asymmetric information,
bounded rationality, and opportunism pose for coordinating the
activities that together result in innovation.
In sum, mainstream theories fail to explore how patents
impact economic behavior in contexts that adequately reflect
44. Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the
Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 895 (2009) (suggesting a new approach to international patent law to address different modes
of innovation such as user innovation and open and collaborative innovation
practices).
45. See ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES FOR INNOVATION, supra note 38; WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 93–115 (1969).
46. Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
2257, 2260 (2010) (“Innovation occupies a central place in intellectual property
legal scholarship. As much as it is relished and pursued, however, it is almost
never critically explored.”).
47. See Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the
Impact of Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y, 135, 143–48
(2004).
48. Cf. Strandburg, supra note 44, at 881.
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the characteristics and needs of systems of innovation and core
attributes of the human decision-makers who shape them.49
While recognizing that some level of abstraction from reality is
inevitable, and even essential in policy design, mainstream approaches ignore too many critical aspects of the complex activities that drive innovation and the actors who engage in them.
As a result, mainstream theories provide inadequate guidance
for environments characterized by rapidly changing technologies and complex and diverse paradigms of innovation.50 The
limitations of the traditional approaches to patent law have
been reflected in the limited and mixed results produced by the
empirical literature seeking to quantify the effects of patents on
innovation and economic growth.51 This lack of definitive empirical results can be attributed, at least in part, to the lack of
richer models of innovation in patent law and the corresponding paucity of variables connecting changes in patent law with
changes in economic behavior.52
While the broader law and economics literature points out
other, non-incentive based functions that patents might play,
including communication and signaling functions,53 coordination functions,54 and accounting functions,55 such functions
have not been adequately incorporated into mainstream approaches for analyzing patents and innovation. I argue that one
of the reasons for this is the absence of a general methodology
49. See e.g., ARTI RAI, STUART GRAHAM & MARK DOMS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING ECONOMIC
GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 3–5 (2010), available at
http://2001-2009.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/@opa/documents/con
tent/prod01_009147.pdf.
50. See Kappos Testimony, supra note 1, at 8 (advocating for patent reform in the face of unprecedented technological change and static patent
laws).
51. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 531 (demonstrating that empirical literature is
inconclusive on whether stronger patents increase or decrease innovation); see
also Hahn, supra note 9, at 2 (concluding that the economics literature yields
few general lessons for patents).
52. See e.g., Michelle Gittelman, A Note on the Value of Patents as Indicators of Innovation: Implications for Management Research, 22 ACAD. MGMT.
PERSP., Aug. 2008, at 26.
53. Patents might be used to signal the value of intangible assets by firms
seeking financing, for example. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 625 (2002) (exploring the signaling role of patents and arguing that patents allow disclosure of R&D capacity and value of human capital to attract
investment and licensing opportunities).
54. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 9, at 398–406.
55. Heald, supra note 9.
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for examining the systemic effects of patents on processes of
innovation.56 The existing literature has remained largely peripheral to core decisions about patent law and policy as a result of its fragmented nature and challenges in operationalizing
many of the insights that it contains, with a resulting loss in
opportunities for more effective policy design.57
In this paper I am proposing an approach that does not
dismiss, but rather builds on the traditional law and economics
approaches to patent law. It takes the existing neoclassicalbased framework and relaxes key assumptions about rational
actors, perfect competition, and costless transactions to accommodate the institutional environments in which innovation
takes place. In Parts II and III, I suggest that it is possible to
relax these assumptions and incorporate the context of innovation in a way that is still tractable and susceptible to modeling
and testing. By allowing for a more contextualized analysis of
how innovation takes place, the approach makes it easier to
identify and act upon opportunities for improving innovation
outcomes through patent law change. By providing a theoretical framework grounded in the analysis of transactions, the approach provides for analytical tractability.
II. EXPANDING BOUNDARIES THROUGH NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
NIE has been used to explain the evolution of and opportunities for improvement in our current systems of regulating interactions between economic actors in a growing number of areas, most particularly that of economic development. In this
Part, I explore how NIE methodologies can address the challenges of effective patent policy design.58 I begin with a description of the core concepts underlying NIE, and I then focus specifically on the contributions made by Williamson and North

56. As an example, the role of patents as devices for signaling firm value
may arise initially due to asymmetric information, but may become more significant as norms of venture capital investment emerge. Patents may, over
time, become a proxy for more difficult calculations of value in early stage financing. Models which focus on only one mechanism—such as an incomplete
contract story or a business norm story—give us an incomplete picture of what
patents are doing.
57. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 23, at 1036–38.
58. See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 72 (1998).
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and explain how these contributions are particularly useful in
formulating an alternative methodology for patent law design.
A. CORE CONCEPTS OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
NIE is best understood as a research movement that provides a new way of analyzing economic phenomena built
around a set of shared beliefs, or principles, about how to study
economic behavior and performance.59 It encompasses different
methodologies and areas of focus. NIE scholars build on, modify, and extend neoclassical economic theory to provide a central
role for “institutions,” which can be variously understood as
“the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.”60 or the “prescriptions that humans use to organize all
forms of repetitive and structured interactions.”61 They incorporate the roles of formal rules—such as property rights and
patent rights—and informal rules—such as norms of sharing
information, their governance, organizations, and the multiple
dimensions, motivations, and limitations of human actors in
order to explain economic phenomena.62 They see economic activities as being embedded within an institutional framework,
and the central purposes of NIE include explaining the determinants of institutions and their evolution over time and evaluating their impact on economic performance.63 Differences in
economic systems are explored and explained in light of their
institutions and institutional environment. Coase, Williamson,
59. Paul L. Joskow, Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report
Card, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 1, 3 (Éric Brousseau
& Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2008).
60. Douglass C. North, Washington University, Prize Lecture for the
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
Economic Performance Through Time, Part II (Dec. 9, 1993),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/northlecture.html.
61. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 13
(2005). Ostrom’s work focuses on the use of collective action, trust and cooperation in managing common pool resources.
62. Claude Ménard, Methodological Issues in New Institutional Economics, 8 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 85, 86 (2001) (examining the methodological
challenges that face NIE, including moving from the analysis of transaction
costs to the dynamics of innovation); Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Economics
3
(1998)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=115811 (to access article, select One-Click Download)
(providing an overview of NIE).
63. See Ronald H. Coase, University of Chicago, Prize Lecture for the
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel: The
Institutional
Structure
of
Production
(Dec.
9,
1991),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coaselecture.html.
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and North are considered to be the founders of NIE, and their
work informs our understanding of the core concepts of NIE.
The focus of NIE, to the extent there is a single focus for a
loosely grouped set of analytical approaches, is on coordination
of economic activities through formal and informal rules, and
on the alternative governance structures within an institutional environment that are a product of political, historical, economic and social forces.64 Property rights and patent rights are
formal institutions designed to describe the boundaries of, and
allocate control rights over, the disposition and use of resources. Formal rules interact with informal rules, such as
norms and customs regarding fairness and business attitudes,
to create the “institutional environment,” or set of background
constraints, that guide transactions. 65 North draws an analogy
between the institutional environment and the rules of a game,
with institutions defining and limiting the set of choices available to individuals.66 Individuals or individual entities enter into agreements to govern their specific relationships in light of
the background rules.67 These arrangements are often referred
to as governance structures, and include the use of contracts
and different types of public and private bureaucracy as alternative ways to organize economic activities.68 Governance involves the interaction of public and private orderings; public
ordering can be viewed as the “rules of the game,” while private
ordering can be viewed as the “play of the game.”69 Organizations can be understood as groups of people and the arrangements those people create to coordinate their collective actions,
and include firms, government entities, universities, families,

64. NIE provides multiple methodologies for studying economic behavior,
including a combination of mathematical modeling, case studies, econometric
modeling, and experiments to test alternative theories. See Joskow, supra note
59, at xxxix-xli (exploring the methodologies of NIE). NIE encompasses diverse
work on transaction costs, agency costs, property rights, incomplete contracts,
social costs, collective action, and hierarchy and organization. See, e.g., Brian
Dollery, New Institutional Economics and the Analysis of the Public Sector, 18
REV. POL’Y RES. 185 passim (2001).
65. See North, supra note 60.
66. Id. at Part III.
67. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
4–5 (1996).
68. See, e.g., id. at 5.
69. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 438, 438 (2002).
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and other collective structures.70 Organizations are not only
players in the game, but are also involved in shaping and
changing the rules of the game; “[i]t is the interaction between
institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional
evolution of an economy.”71
As an example of what these terms mean in practice, the
Bayh-Dole Act changed the rules regarding ownership of inventions developed using public funding, allowing universities and
other research entities to elect title to patents obtained for such
inventions—a change in the rules of the game.72 As a result,
universities and other research entities began to work in new
ways with industry partners, including licensing arrangements
and other forms of collaboration previously unavailable—a
change in governance, or how the game is played.73 The effects
of this rule change took place within an institutional environment that has modified the behavioral responses to the rule
change in ways that are still being explored.74
B. WILLIAMSON’S METHODOLOGY
While much of the work done in NIE takes the form of a
particular theoretical and/or methodological approach to economic behavior, Williamson is one of the few to offer both a
broad analytical framework for studying the organization of
economic activity and a way of operationalizing his conceptual
framework.75 Williamson provides a system-based approach to
the study of economic activity, anchoring individual transactions within a social, legal, economic, and political context.76 Alternative mechanisms for coordinating economic activity are
examined in the face of bounded rationality, opportunism, and

70. See Joskow, supra note 59, at 5–6 (discussing the core principles of the
NIE research approach).
71. North, Economic Performance through Time, supra note 60, at Part
III.
72. See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 202–212 (2006).
73. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and
the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003) (emphasizing that while it is
clear that licensing has an effect on university technology transfers, more research is needed to fully understand the impacts licensing brings to the research environment).
74. See id. (explaining that though licensing by universities has increased
dramatically, the effects on the research environment are unclear).
75. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking
Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 595, 595–96 (2000).
76. See id. at 596–97.
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the vulnerabilities that arise in exchange transactions.77 At the
core of his approach is the notion that we can best understand
economic activity through an analysis of the organizational
structures, or institutions, by which exchange under conditions
of scarcity takes place.78 Transactions, rather than composite
goods and services, are seen as the fundamental unit of analysis.79 These transactions occur in settings that limit trading
partners and trade opportunities based on existing relationships, knowledge, sunk investments, and other aspects of asset
specificity.80 Multiple dimensions of transactions are studied,
thus connecting very different theories of human behavior and
its determinants.81 I argue that the problems Williamson
struggles with help to illuminate the problems that patent policy-makers should be struggling with. His insights are critical in
understanding when and why governance matters in processes
of innovation.
Given the importance of human actions and decisions in
the process of innovation, a core part of the analysis of patents
and innovation must include the study of human attributes
that are likely to influence both types and levels of innovative
activity as well as downstream use of new innovations (e.g.
through adoption of new technologies, or changes in preferences towards new goods). Simon, one of the pioneers in the
study of the decision making process within economic organizations, makes reference to two key attributes of human actors:
their cognitive ability and self-interestedness.82 Williamson reflects these attributes in his own way through concepts of
77. See id. at 600–01.
78. See id. at 595–96. The term “New Institutional Economics” was originated by Williamson, and its best known representatives are Williamson,
North, and Coase. Coase, supra note 58, at 72.
79. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 67, at 6–7.
80. Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction
Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 626 (2010).
81. WILLIAMSON, supra note 67, at 6–7.
82. Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 303 (1985) (stressing
that policy-makers should be prepared to address the key attributes of human
actors in fashioning theories that depend on particular views of human decision making); see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209, S223–S224 (1986); Oliver E. Williamson, Human Actors and Economic Organization, 6–8 (Università degli Studi di Siena,
Working Paper No. 247, 1999), available at ; North, Economic Performance
through Time, supra note 60, at Part II.
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bounded rationality, transaction costs, and uncertainty.83 As he
describes, “[a]ttributes of human actors that bear crucially on
the lens of contract/governance are cognition, self-interest, and
foresight (where the last can be considered an extension upon
cognition).”84 Human actors act with bounded rationality,
meaning that they respond rationally in the face of imperfect
information and the need to economize in making decisions–
they attempt “rationally to cope.”85 They act with self-interest,
meaning that routine activities occur in a spirit of cooperation
give way to a more calculative orientation as the stakes for defection increase.86 The capacity for “feasible foresight” allows
parties to limit some of the negative effects of this opportunism
by constructing mechanisms that allow for credible commitments to behave cooperatively.87
To operationalize this transaction cost approach, Williamson emphasizes a focus on specific phenomena, such as the paradigmatic NIE problem of vertical integration.88 “The transaction is made the basic unit of analysis, and is thereafter
dimensionalized (with emphasis on asset specificity, contractual disturbances (uncertainty), and frequency).”89 The focus is
economizing on transaction costs through the alignment of
transactions and their different attributes with governance
structures, which diverge in their cost and competence.90 The
framework is one of contracting, and the results are susceptible
to empirical testing.91 This methodology provides an important
departure from the traditional approaches to patent theory described in Part I; it is seeking to build a contextualized understanding of behavior out of a collection of observations that
form the basis for modeling and testing, rather than starting
with a general theory that relies on empirical support based on
limited data such as research and development (R&D) spending
and patents filed.
83. See Williamson, supra note 82, at 3–5.
84. Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction 9
(Econ.
Discussion
Papers,
No.
2007-3,
2007)
available
at
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2007-3 (to access article, select download PDF).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 9–10.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 12.
91. Id. at 17–18.
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C. NORTH AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS
North begins from a very different vantage point, and with
different objectives in mind. He looks at different national
economies as a whole, and explores differences in their paths of
economic development and opportunities that they may have
for changing their adaptive efficiency as new conditions arise.92
He focuses on the political economy of rule design and implementation, exposing the various limits of existing decision making structures and the influence of politics, unequal bargaining
power, and ideologies on institutional change.93 North’s work
suggests the need to integrate the limitations of institutional
capacity into the analysis of rule design.94 It is not just those
subject to the rules, but also those designing and implementing
the rules who are subject to bounded rationality and opportunism; there is no implication that the resulting institutions are
efficient.95 Instead, ideas and ideologies play important roles in
shaping institutions and in limiting possibilities for change.96
This suggests a second best approach to policy making, in
which patent laws are selecting not only for their impact on organizational structure, but also for their robustness to special
interests and to errors in implementation.97 Thus, the emphasis
in the organizational approach is on rule-making in a second
best world.

92. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 102–08
(1991).
93. See id. at 108–11.
94. See Douglas C. North, New Institutional Economics and Development
1 (1993) (Working Paper), available at http://www2.econ.iastate.edu
/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7–8.
97. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7, at 1341–42; Mark A. Lemley, Can
the Patent Office Be Fixed? 1–3 (Stanford L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 396,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1668203 (to access article, select
One-Click Download); cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Legal Process
and the Discovery of Better Policies for Fostering Innovation and Growth 1–5
(Ill. Program in L., Behavior, and Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. LBSS11–06,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739312 (to access article, select
One-Click Download) (suggesting that jurisdictional choice principles could
effectively address issues of special interest capture of policy through market
principles).
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D. USING NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS TO REORIENT PATENT
POLICY
The questions asked by NIE scholars, including work done
on incomplete contracts, decisions about vertical integration,
and theories of the firm, arise with particular force in the context of situations where intellectual property rules come into
play.98 NIE theories explore the impact of alternative rules,
particularly property rights, in addressing the challenges of coordination, such as reducing information costs, increasing certainty in transactions, reducing the costs of bargaining and exchange, preventing free riding, and controlling negative
externalities.99 There is a growing body of theoretical and applied work in the patent literature suggesting that patent
rights, along with other formal rules, play important roles in
determining the existing structures within which innovation
occurs and the performance of these structures.100 Applied

98. See Burk, supra note 9, at 3 (“In a so-called information age, where
the most important assets of firms increasingly are intangible assets, one
might expect that property-based theories of the firm would be readily applied
to intellectual property.”); Kieff, supra note 9, at 330 (“The tools NIE uses to
conduct comparative institutional analyses have played a central role in the
scholarly debate within property theory about the shifts that occur over time
among property regimes. . . . [But] the basic case for or against formal property rights for IP backed up by property rules has largely escaped the attention
of the NIE literature.”) (footnote omitted); Merges, supra note 9, at 1877
(2000) (“Property rights, firms, institutions, governments: all of these are the
subject of extensive study by social scientists operating within the [New Institutional Economics] framework. It is time to integrate the study of IPRs into
this framework.”).
99. The NIE research agenda is focused on how institutions (such as the
laws governing property rights) matter and how they change over time. See
e.g., Coase, supra note 58.
100. For important work at the intersection of patents and NIE see Anton
& Yao, supra note 41, at 190–192 (analyzing the ability of independent inventors to negotiate with firms in the absence of patent protection); Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9, at 3; Jonathan M.
Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets 1 (Univ. S. Cal. Center in Law, Econ., & Org. Research Paper No.
C08–22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287283 (to access article, select One-Click Download) (explaining that sharing of intellectual property can lower transaction costs, but requires a framework to operate within);
Burk, supra note 9, at 3 (2004) (examining intellectual property laws in light
of theories of the firm); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 37–39 (2004) (drawing analogies between IP and public utility regulation, and revisiting Coase’s critique of proposals for public subsidies to reduce costs to marginal cost in the context of
IP); Gallini & Winter, supra note 41, at 238 (exploring the role of patents in
opening markets for trade in technological innovation); Paul J. Heald, Trans-
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work, including both historical studies of specific inventions
and markets, such as the study of the steam engine, and case
studies of specific markets or industries, such as the semiconductor industry, enrich the contextual framework for studying the intersection of patents and economic behavior.101 Higher level theories based on specific applications of NIE tools play
an important role in identifying specific functions that patents
might play in facilitating or reducing the cost of innovation activities.102 Such functions include reducing transaction costs,
facilitating the transfer of information, and allowing parties to
coordinate their actions.103 A third body of relevant work disaction Costs and Patent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 447, 448 (2007) (arguing that effects on transaction costs need to be studied carefully in any attempt at patent reform); Kieff, supra note 9, at 328–30
(focusing on the link between property rule treatment and coordination); Mark
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (arguing that ex post justifications for the existence of intellectual property are misleading); Clarisa Long, Information Costs
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 471 (2004) (examining the relationship and implications of intellectual property and information costs);
Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost
of Commercial Exchange, supra note 41, at 1590–91 (discussing how intellectual property rights lower transaction costs); Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, supra note 9. For a study of specific innovation structures addressing key issues relevant to patent policy design, see, for example, Carliss Y. Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative
Innovation 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 10–803,2009), available
at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/ 10-038.pdf (arguing that collaborative innovation and innovation by individuals both need to be addressed by policymakers). This list is illustrative of the general trends in this area and is not
meant to be exhaustive.
101. Examples of historical studies include: Christine MacLeod & Alessandro Nuvolari, Patents and Industrialization: An Historical Overview of the
British Case, 1624–1907, at 2–3 (Laboratory Econ. & Mgmt., Working Paper
Series 2010), available at http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2010-04.pdf
(examining the historical connection between patents and industrialization);
Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention during the British Industrial Revolution: the Case of the Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 347,
349 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of collective invention, rather than
intellectual property rights, in the invention of the steam engine). Examples of
case studies include: Peter C. Grindley & David Teece, Managing Intellectual
Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39,
Vol. 2 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1997).
102. For mid-level theories, see Barnett, supra note 9, at 1 (allowing for
more efficient specialization economies); Heald, supra note 9 (discussing
transaction cost-reducing functions of patent law); Kieff, supra note 9, at 345–
46 (explaining the coordination function of intellectual property).
103. See, e.g., Anton & Yao, supra note 41, at 190–192; Barnett, supra note
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cusses the political economy of the patent system and its implications for patent reform.104
These different approaches demonstrate the potential that
the analytical tools of NIE have to shed light on new aspects of
patent law, but the literature lacks a foundation that can connect specific empirical studies and the insights of theoretical
models to each other and to more comprehensive models of innovation.105 The absence of such a foundation has limited the
reach of NIE to influence patent policy. A key objective in developing a methodology and framework for thinking about patents and the organization of innovation is to promote the integration of existing results and the connection of these results
with both the real life systems within which different kinds of
innovation take place and the legislative, administrative, and
judicial systems that determine the directions of patent law.
Applying the insights from this literature to inform patent policy, the central inquiry for patent policymakers becomes one of
determining what roles patents play in structuring, facilitating,
or impeding desired processes of innovation.106
100, at 1; Barnett, supra note 9, at 3; Baldwin & Hippel, supra note 100 Burk,
supra note 9, at 3; Duffy, supra note 100; Gallini & Winter, supra note 41, at
238; Heald, supra note 9, Kieff, supra note 9, at 328–30; Lemley, supra note
100, Long, supra note 100; Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New
Institutional Economics, supra note 9; Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the
Law: Intellectual Property and the Cost of Commercial Exchange, supra note
41, at 1590–91.
104. See, e.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 7 (advocating for an analysis of
the patent system’s political economy in order to fully understand patent reform); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003) (exploring
the importance of institutional design for patent policy).
105. See W. Patrick McCray, Re-Thinking Innovation: A New Agenda for
PROGRESS
(May
14,
2010),
Academic
Investigation,
SCI.
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2010/05/re-thinking-innovation (discussing the
disconnected analysis of innovation and the need for a middle ground that
makes extrapolation to real world innovation possible).
106. For examples of efforts made in this direction see Brett Frischmann,
Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801
(2009–2010) (arguing that regulating the effects of the externalities-producing
patent system requires an understanding of the varied institutions in which
patents operate); see also Brett Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2143 (2008–2009) (explaining that changes in patent law are shifting
the university research system to a more commercial orientation); Arti K. Rai,
The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation,
Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
173, 180 (2001) (arguing that genomic advances could reduce drug development costs enough to scale back pharmaceutical patent protection); Barnett,
Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, supra note 9, at 3–4 (arguing
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III. A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO PATENT
LAW
I advocate an organizational approach to patents that is
based on the premises that: (1) the organization of economic activity is an important determinant of innovation outcomes; (2)
patents play a role in determining the organization of innovation; and (3) patent laws should be designed to support the operation and evolution of diverse socially beneficial processes of
innovation.107 The approach offers a way of implementing the
insight that patents should be studied and evaluated in terms
of their impact on processes of innovation, viewed in terms of
transactional structures occurring within a particular institutional context. The first step in patent policy design is to characterize existing or potential desired transactional structures of
innovation and the institutional environment within which
they occur, and the second step is to explore the roles that patents play in the cost and feasibility of these structures. Opportunities for policy design involve relating conditions of innovation to design features of patent law within a given
institutional context.108
A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Several basic principles emerge from this perspective on
patent policy to guide the design of patent law.
1. Support Systems of Innovation, Not Acts of Invention
Patent law should ultimately be about improving the performance of systems of innovation, not incentivizing acts of invention. Therefore, patents should be studied and evaluated in
terms of their impact on processes of innovation. The characterthat patent rights create more efficient organizational forms).
107. The existing literature supports the view that patents can play an important role in shaping the transactional structure of production. See, e.g.,
Barnett, supra note 9, Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual
Boundaries, supra note 106, Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, supra note 106,
Arti K. Rai, supra note 106. The question of whether markets will select the
most efficient paths of innovation or whether regulators should play a role in
favoring one mode of innovation over another is beyond the scope of this Article. The organizational approach can accommodate both views. Indeed, the approach suggests that paths of innovation will be the product of some combination of public and private ordering.
108. See, e.g., Ménard, Methodological Issues in New Institutional Economics, supra note 62, at 86–87.
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istics of the innovation process and the institutional environment within which these activities occur provide the contextual
framework within which patent rights are examined and design opportunities identified. This approach readily encompasses innovation from different sources, including not only
producers but also public actors and user driven innovation. It
also encompasses the entire process of innovation, from invention, design, and development, through to adoption and use.109
2. Focus on Transactions as the Basic Units of Analysis
In order to understand how patents and other forms of
regulation impact the organization of innovation we need to examine the transactional structures underlying different processes of innovation within their institutional context. Innovation can be understood as a process of creating something new
and of value to a particular community.110 It is driven by human agents acting with self-interest and imperfect information,
and it is shaped by the types of arrangements or transactions
that they engage in with each other to exploit opportunities to
benefit from exchange.111 Patents, along with other institutions, are viewed as “humanly devised constraints that structure [perhaps imperfectly] political, economic and social interaction” in processes of innovation.112 Patent laws and the
systems of governance which enforce them influence the feasibility and cost of alternative ways of organizing human activities relevant to innovation.113
3. Respond to the Existing Institutional Environment and the
Limits of Individual Decision Making
Patent law must be designed in light of the limitations on
decision-makers and imperfections in the existing institutional
environment. The assumption of rational actors with full in109. See, e.g., Brian Kahin, Beyond the Box: Innovation Policy in an Innovation-Driven Economy, SCI. PROGRESS (July 13, 2009), http://www.science
progress.org/2009/07beyond-the-box (exploring the understanding of innovation underlying government efforts such as the American COMPETES Act of
2007).
110. Cf. McCray, supra note 105.
111. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, supra note 75, at 600–01.
112. North, supra note 92, at 97.
113. See Barnett, supra note 9, Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, supra note 106; Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, supra
note 106; Rai, supra note 106.
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formation is replaced with presumptions of bounded rationality
that reflect the limited capacity people have to obtain and process information in most situations.114 Instrumental rationality
is rejected (at least in part) and choices are instead based on
mental models informed by values, norms, and experiences.115
Bounded rationality provides opportunities for opportunistic
behavior in the face of incomplete contracts and imperfect contractual enforcement, and creates transactions costs in the coordination of economic activities.116 It is because of these imperfections that institutions and alternative modes of organizing
economic activities become important; in the absence of these
imperfections all activities could be conducted through market
exchange and the use of enforceable contracts.117 Property
rights and their interpretation become important because they
necessitate and structure transactions and influence transaction costs as a part of the functioning of such markets.118 Perfect market benchmarks are replaced with comparisons of alternative outcomes in imperfect markets. As F. Scott Kieff
explains:
NIE emphasizes the use of comparative institutional analysis to look
at the different characteristics of institutions and what impact they
have on individuals and organizations over time. Such an approach
means we should ask not only what we want to achieve, but also
which mix of formal and informal institutions will work better in
achieving our set of goals.119

114. The concept of bounded rationality is attributed to Herbert Simon. See
also Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, supra note 75, at 600–01; Douglass C. North, The New Institutional
Economics and Development at 1 (Wash. U. Working Paper, 1992), available at
http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf (“What [NIE] abandons is
instrumental rationality—the assumption of neoclassical economics that has
made it an institution-free theory.”).
115. See Douglas C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third
World Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 20–21 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995); see also North,
supra note 114; Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–01.
116. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–01.
117. These same limitations apply to the institutions themselves, as North
points out, resulting in the persistence of imperfect institutions, and the need
for pragmatic approaches to policy design. North, supra note 115, at 17–18,
24–26.
118. See Heald, supra note 100; Merges, Expanding Boundaries of the Law:
Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange, supra note 41, at
1590–91; Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in
Innovation Markets, supra note 100.
119. Kieff, supra note 9, at 339.
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This emphasis becomes particularly important when evaluating the opportunities that patent laws offer as policy levers
in improving economic outcomes in imperfectly competitive
markets that are subject to other forms of public and private
orderings.120
4. Seek Robustness to the Political Economy of Rule Making
and Engage in a Comparative Analysis of Alternative Rules
The political economy of rule design and the comparative
analysis of alternative regulatory strategies within a given context are important parts of policy analysis. Those designing and
implementing the rules are themselves subject to the limitations of bounded rationality and opportunism.121 Institutions
will inevitably be imperfect, and opportunities for change will
be constrained by path dependence and influenced by ideas and
ideologies.122 The design and enforcement of patent laws are
both shaped by the social, cultural, and political structures in
which systems of innovation are embedded, and by cognitive
processes such as ideologies regarding ownership and attitudes
towards risk.123 Alternative forms of regulation are evaluated
in light of the existing institutional environment and the constraints operating on processes of rule change and adoption.124
In evaluating institutions such as patent laws and how
they change, the organizational approach retains the methodological individualism inherent in traditional neoclassical-based
approaches.125 Institutions such as patent laws are understood
as “systems of rules created to offset uncertainty and risk by
providing a social structure that allows humans to gain certain
120. See Coase, supra note 42, at 195. See also Nancy T. Gallini & Susan
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, 2
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 71–72 (2002) (asserting that private contracting can alter conclusions about optimal patent design and public and private
instruments and this may be complementary in reducing social costs).
121. See North, supra note 115, at 17–18, 23.
122. See North, supra note 92, at 97–98, 109–110.
123. See North, supra note 115, at 18–20.
124. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 601.
125. NIE does not escape the limitations of methodological individualism.
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics 46–
47(Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 9–78, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518836 (to access article, select One-Click Download) (arguing that continuing methodological individualism limits understanding of institutions). In addition methodological individualism, may not
adequately capture certain instrumental goals of patent law, such as goals
that are based on natural rights.
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control over their environment.”126 They emerge as a result of
cumulative individual choices that are continually reshaped by
human beliefs and decisions.127 Institutional contexts are seen
as the collective result of institutions, or systems of rules, that
emerge through individual choices.128
In developing contextual models of economic activity, NIE
draws liberally from many other disciplines, including law, history, organization theory, cognitive science, political science,
sociology, and anthropology.129 This encompassing approach is
necessitated by the recognition that rules and the governance
structures which enforce them are the imperfect, context dependent products of human actors, operating with limited cognitive competence in various historical, cultural, economic, and
social contexts.130 The use of a contextual framework encourages multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary methods of analysis that are much needed in patent policy.131 Innovation systems are influenced by overlapping and constantly evolving
institutions from a variety of different fields, including science,
politics and law.132 Policy-makers must understand these different institutions and their interactions. Moreover, they must
consider institutional structures to bridge the cultural gaps,
and to facilitate the flow of information between entities involved in rule development and enforcement, as well as the
need to develop formal procedures for learning as part of the
efficient evolution of institutions.133

126. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).; Claude Ménard, Markets as Institutions
Versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts,
28 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG.161, 164–67 (1995).
127. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 598.
128. See Klein, supra note 62, at 3–7.
129. See id. at 1.
130. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600–04; see also North, supra note
114, at 7.
131. See Natalia Boliari & Kudret Topyan, Conceptualizing Institutions
and Organizations: A Critical Approach, 5 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 1, 2–4 (2007),
available at http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JBER/article/view/2507/
2553.
132. Id.
133. The costs of failing to achieve an effective integration of law and science are illustrated by a recent study of the criminal and scientific investigations that followed the United States anthrax scare in 2001. See Erin Murphy
& David Sklansky, Science, Suspects, and Systems: Lessons from the Anthrax
Investigation, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art. 3, 1–2 (2009).
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B. FRAMEWORK FOR CHARACTERIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
According to the organizational approach, patents are one
of many institutions that, together with governance structures,
characterize the institutional environment within which transactions take place.134 The institutional environment consists of
five interconnected levels of social analysis which constrain behavior. These levels are: (1) “cognition,” or individual patterns
of decision making under uncertainty, (2) “informal rules,” or
“embedded institutions,” including the formation and effect of
norms, values and conventions that shape the context of innovation, such as those governing the “production” of science and
technological advance, and those influencing and constraining
the evolution and effects of patent laws; (3) “formal rules,” or
the “institutional environment,” the direct constraints on decision making, including patent rights and other formal rules
relevant to processes of innovation; (4) “governance structures,”
or “institutional arrangements,” such as firms, different market
structures, government, and hybrid forms of collaboration; and
(5) “institutions of resource allocation,” such as marginal
changes in activity levels in response to stronger or weaker patent rights.135 Opportunities for policy intervention occur at different levels of the framework. Interaction occurs between the
different levels.136 In some cases the interactions may strengthen the effectiveness of a policy change, but in other cases they
may inhibit it. The framework provides a way of structuring
the analysis that a policy maker would engage in when choosing between alternative patent laws, such as presumptive versus limited availability of injunctions against patent infringers,
based on likelihood of achieving desired innovation objectives.

134. Williamson provides an analytical framework for examining changes
in economic behavior that emphasizes the interaction between four levels of
social analysis and the differential rates of change at different levels, and I
adapt this framework to the needs of patent law. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, supra note 75, at 595–600;
Williamson, Human Actors and Economic Organization, supra note 82, at 1–4,
34–35.
135. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 595–600.
136. These five layers of analysis are adapted from Williamson’s four levels
of social analysis to fit the needs of patent law. Williamson’s four levels of
analysis are embeddedness, the institutional environment, governance, and
resource allocation. See id.
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The alternative rules would be situated within the framework
and then examined in light of connections with higher and lower levels of institutional constraints.
1. Cognition
This level of analysis looks at the mental models that govern individual behavior, and the intersection of the mental
models with formal and informal rules.137 Areas of particular
relevance to innovation include the relationship between cognitive processes and formal and informal institutions in shaping
decision making under uncertainty. The combination of ideology, understood as a shared set of mental models possessed by
groups of individuals, and institutions may help agents to cope
with complex decision making under conditions of uncertainty,
for example.138 Gaining a better understanding of how actors in
processes of innovation respond to different kinds and magnitudes of uncertainty could help policymakers assess the relative costs associated with alternative types of uncertainty created by patent law.139 Ideologies may influence the
effectiveness of patents at motivating or deterring certain kinds
of behavior. The relationship between patents and beliefs about
autonomy, for example, may inform the ways in which people
respond to them, both as developers and users of inventions.140
People may be predisposed to behave in ways that support certain forms of cooperative production, and patents may operate
either to support or to interfere with cooperative outcomes. Ideologies may also play an important role in the politicaleconomic framework for understanding the nature and limits of
existing institutions and the potential for positive change.141
137. Williamson describes this as an “evolutionary level in which the
mechanisms of the mind take place.” Id. at 600.
138. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3, 3–4 (1994) (defining ideology, institutions, and mental models, and describing their interactions with one another).
139. See, e.g., Joshua S. Gans, David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, The Impact of
Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from
Patent Grant Delays, J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 1–3 (2006) (considering the impact of the IP system on the timing of cooperation and licensing by start-up
technology entrepreneurs); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 6–
11 (discussing the importance of clear boundaries in patent law).
140. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–8
(2011) (discusses importance of non-utilitarian principles in justifying patents).
141. See North, Institutions, supra note 93, at 109–111; DOUGLASS C.

6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH

2/27/2012 2:20 PM

243

Incorporating the cognitive level into the institutional environment provides an opportunity to explore both the importance of mental models in constraining behavior relevant to
innovation, such as risk taking, and potential avenues for responding to these limitations through, for example, patent law
change.142 Experimental economics, behavioral economics, and
experimental psychology may provide underutilized avenues
for exploring these aspects of human learning and decision
making and their implications for the design of patent laws.143
2. Embedded Institutions (Informal Rules)
Informal rules include the norms, values, customs, and
conventions that shape behavior relevant to systems of innovation.144 For example, they include both informal rules that influence how science and technology are “produced” and resulting innovations developed and deployed,145 and informal rules
that influence the evolution of patent laws and their effectiveness. Policy analysis under the organizational approach requires the study of the different aspects of the embeddedness of
innovation—whether cultural, structural, or political—and the
implications that the embeddedness has for patent policy.146 Informal rules depend on existing political, social, and cognitive
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
85–86 (1990).
142. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 600.
143. Experimental psychology and behavioral economics may provide insights into how individuals respond to different risk-reward systems as well as
on transformational aspects of creating ownership over intangibles. E.g., Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 140–42 (2009) (discussing the use of games
and simulations to investigate how actors respond to various patent situations).
144. See Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it
is Headed, 146 DE ECONOMIST 23, 26–29 (1998).
145. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW
SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 15–17 (1987) (offering a contested approach to the empirical study of science and technology which emphasizes that science and technology must be studied “in the making,” and
looking at the social construction of science through the study of laboratory
processes and systems). While many may disagree with Latour’s view of the
social construction of science, he offers a useful perspective on the different
types of formal and informal rules that together channel economic activity.
146. Williamson, supra note 75, at 597. See e.g. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1443–47 (2010) (offering
an example of the importance of embedded analysis in the context of evaluating open systems of innovation).

6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

244

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 2:20 PM

[Vol. 13:1

structures for change and thus “deliberate choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated.”147 Since change at this level
is slower and more difficult to control than change in subsequent levels, it is often neglected when exploring policy options.148 But the constraints that informal rules place on opportunities for effective rule change are a critical part of the policy
making equation.149
Examining the interaction of patent laws, which are formal
rules, with relevant informal rules requires attention to those
features of the scientific and technological environments that
are relevant to the production and sharing of knowledge. Different types of innovation processes may be organized around
very different norms governing the production and use of
knowledge, norms which are often in tension with patent
rights. Efforts to understand this intersection have begun at
the university level, where tensions arise between traditional
academic norms of information sharing and the pull of commercial interests from licensing opportunities and industry collaborations.150 Cross-country studies reveal the role of culture and
social norms in determining the effectiveness of formal rules
such as intellectual property laws.151 Cross-generational behavior is informative in exploring the power of informal norms in
shaping behavior, even in the face of contradictory formal rules,
particularly as new technologies and patterns of use emerge
that clash with rules designed for very different technologies.152
147. Williamson, supra note 144, at 27.
148. Id.
149. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. 21–
22, 32–34 (explaining that a complex system of norms has developed to deal
with the deficiencies in patent law in many industries, making change to the
law difficult).
150. See, e.g., Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes
for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001)
(possible loss in quality of research); Jerry Thursby and Marie Thursby, Policy
Forum, Where is the New Science in Corporate R&D, 314 SCI. 1547 (2006)
(frictions created by bargaining over IP); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733
(2001) (discussion in the context of copyright law that raises issues with application to patent law in the international context); John F. Duffy, Harmony and
Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002).
152. The use of file sharing technologies like Napster provides a good example. See NAPSTER, http://napster.com (last visited October 12, 2011).
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Although mostly factors at this level are seen as constraints on
formal rule change, formal rules can play a role in altering the
context of innovation. Patents might alter not only the production of scientific discoveries, for example, but also the way in
which science is understood.153 Patents might also have a
transformative effect.
3. Institutional Environment (Formal Rules)
This level includes both the evolution and application of
patent rights and other formal rules relevant to innovation.
The patent policy opportunities at this level involve making
changes to patent rights to achieve desired objectives in light of
the existing transactional structures of innovation.154 Much of
the NIE patent literature starts here, with questions about the
roles of patent “property” rights in creating possibilities for exchange.155 These branches of the literature have roots in
Coase’s work on the importance of property rights in the presence of externalities,156 with much of the work centering on the
definition and enforcement of patent rights, and their intersection with contract laws.157 Using the transaction as the basic

153. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in
Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 662 (2004) (Examines the contribution
of patents to the advancement of scientific theory—”the scientific community’s
conceptual understanding of the basic structure and properties of natural
phenomena.”).
154. This framework shares Williamson’s assumption that while recognizing that legal constructs such as the patent system are the product of evolutionary processes and “constrained by the shadow of the past,” the legal system nevertheless provides design opportunities. Williamson, supra note 75, at
598.
155. See, e.g., MERGES, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transaction:
The Case of Patent Pools, in INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS: NOVEL CLAIMS TO
PROTECTION AND THEIR BOUNDARIES 5 (2001) (“Property rights are important
because they necessitate and structure transactions.”); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). Merges examines the intersection of property rights and contract and suggests two major contributions that property rights make to real world contracting—precontractual liability and enforcement flexibility. See also Merges, supra note
15.
156. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(explaining the importance of property rights in the presence of transaction
costs); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783–85 (1972) (explaining the emergence of the firm in terms of information costs and looking at the
impact of alternative allocations of property rights on problems inherent in
team production).
157. See Williamson, supra note 75.
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unit of analysis, alternative forms and allocations of patent
property rights are compared in terms of their effects on ex
ante incentives and the cost and feasibility of resulting production decisions.158 Attention is paid, for example, to how patents
enable the collection of information and property rights from
different rights holders in the process of production.159 Although patent rights diverge from property rights in some respects, they are often analyzed primarily as property rights in
invention, leading to questions about how well patents perform
as property rights within the given administrative system for
awarding and enforcing them.160
Theories of incomplete contracts, team production, and
other property-based theories of patents explore different aspects of patents and their roles in structuring transactions,
with direct implications for patent law. Paul Heald suggests,
for example, that patents lower transaction costs by facilitating
affirmative asset partitioning (shielding assets from creditors
and heirs of the investors in a firm) and addressing problems
arising from team production such as shirking and other opportunistic behavior by team members (reducing the cost of fencing and monitoring), through the establishment of a title registration system for the patentable information.161 Pursuant to
this theory, we need to pay particular attention to how the title
registration system is working.162 Scott Kieff suggests that enforcing patent rights as property rights will support positive
forms of coordination needed for commercialization through a
beacon effect (drawing together complementary users) and a
bargain effect (facilitating the ability of multiple users to negotiate with each other).163 Pursuant to this theory, treating patents as property rights will facilitate commercialization.

158. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 155 (examining the emergence of intellectual property rights exchange institutions and the integration of institutions into existing theory).
159. Barnett, supra note 9, at 39–41 (demonstrating that weaker patent
rights may increase the cost and reduce the opportunities for decentralized
production by increasing the risks of disclosing the information that is imperfectly protected).
160. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing the extent to
which patent rights are property rights).
161. See Heald, supra note 9, at 476–77.
162. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 51–55 (arguing for improvements to the title registration system).
163. See Kieff, supra note 9, at 333–34.
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The “new property rights” literature centers around the
idea that property rights become important where contracts are
incomplete or otherwise difficult to enforce, either because of
unforeseen contingencies, costs of writing contracts, or costs of
enforcement.164 In these cases, as illustrated by pioneers of the
approach such as Oliver Hart, ownership of the underlying assets becomes critical in determining the level of investment in
and the allocation of benefits from the assets.165 This incomplete contracting approach has been usefully applied to explain
observed patterns of ownership over patents, such as why firms
contracting for research and development services might assign
resulting patent rights to the firm providing the services.166
Critical questions for contemporary patent policy include how
patents can be used to address challenges of team production
and collaboration between different organizations, particularly
public-private partnerships.167
The organizational approach provides a theoretical underpinning for many property rights-based proposals for patent reform, as described further in Part IV, by explaining when and
why the predictability and allocation of property rights over inventions matters. It also anchors competing models, including
those based on incomplete contracts, property rights, and
transaction costs, in a larger framework that can accommodate
164. See discussion of new property rights in Merges, supra note 15, at
1484–85 (discussing that the New Property Rights approach was pioneered by
Oliver Hart, Sanford J. Grossman, and John Moore). See generally Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986); Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119, 1121–25 (1990) (assessing the different costs of transactions carried out
within a firm and those carried out through the market).
165. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 132–35 (1999); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts:
Where Do We Stand? 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 743–44 (1999) (examining how
incomplete contracts literature can help us to understand economic phenomena such as the patent system, and taking stock of the strengths and limits of
the literature).
166. See Merges, supra note 15, at 1484–85, for discussion of the New
Property Rights approach and other examples. See also Ashish Arora & Robert
P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and Firm Boundaries,
13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 460–70 (2004); Philippe Aghion & Jean
Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1185, 1189–97 (1994).
167. See e.g., ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, Commodifying Collaborative Research,
in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, (Neil Netanel & Neva
Elkin Koran, eds., 2002) (examines challenges that commodification of ideas
via patent rights creates for collaborative projects and the need to refine patent laws to address increasingly team based discovery).
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the different mechanisms through which rules change behavior
and compare alternative ways of achieving the same behavior.
4. Institutional Arrangements (Governance Structures)
While policy discussions on patent reform seem to be focused primarily on refinements to the formal rules through attention to issues of definition and enforcement of patent rights,
many of the problems with the current patent system instead
involve activities at the intersection of formal rules and governance structures. Not surprisingly, given the emphasis on
challenges of organization in the face of uncertainty, opportunism and bounded rationality this intersection is where most of
the current work on patents and NIE is located.168
Governance concerns “the play of the game” through public
and private orderings such as through contract, government fiat, or internalization within the firm. At their most basic level,
governance structures can be characterized as alternative
mechanisms for decision making and enforcement.169 Analysis
at this level involves: (a) uncovering the structure of transactions and the characteristics of alternative governance structures; and then (b) seeking to align transactions with governance structures in a way that promotes desired outcomes.170
This mechanism incorporates organizational responses to ex
post incentive problems such as costs and other limits on enforcement of rules. Exploring the ways in which activities are
organized in light of existing formal rules and why, is a central
part of this level of analysis.171 Starting with the simplest
transaction, autonomous transacting via the market, we consider reasons for why this type of governance structure might
be unavailable, what alternative structures might address the

168. Burk points to theories of the firm as underutilized tools for examining intellectual property law. Burk, supra note 9 (describing the major transaction costs that delineate the boundaries of the firm as coordination and
agency costs).
169. Williamson, supra note 75, at 599.
170. Id. at 598–599.
171. Key questions at this level include: How do patents influence the costs
associated with alternative governance structures? Do patents allow for certain ways of organizing activities that might otherwise be unavailable (e.g. allowing for decentralization)? Can a change in patent rights reduce the costs
associated with a particular way of organizing innovation activities? Might
patent rights impede certain types of organizational structures?
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problems, and at what cost.172 More generally, governance
structures can be compared in terms of multiple distinctive attributes—markets have very different attributes than direct
regulation.173 These attributes will impact the cost and feasibility of transactions.174 Policy design includes examining the
alignment of governance structure with transactional structure
to produce desirable outcomes. Examples of policy strategies
include reallocating transactions across alternative governance
structures to reduce transaction costs—perhaps by increasing
or decreasing the level of integration within a firm versus use
of the market.175 The literature on vertical integration and theories of the firm play an important role here.176
Analysis includes not only public governance structures
such as governments, courts, and agencies such as the USPTO
and the United States International Trade Commission (ITC),
but also private systems of contracting and enforcement such
as markets, firms, and other forms of collaboration such as patent pools.177 North’s focus on the political economy of rulemaking reminds us that implementation of the rules will inevitably
be imperfect and costly, that alternative governance structures
will alter how the rules impact incentives and the structure of
transactions, and that many activities will occur through pri-

172. See Williamson, supra note 75, at 603 (“We thus begin with autonomous contracting, which is the ideal transaction in both law and economics:
‘sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance.’” (quoting Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 738 (1974))).
173. Id. at 599.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. E.g., Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure and
Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 459–60
(1982); Dan. L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 575; Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, supra note 15;
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, and the Value of Intangible
Assets
(1999)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/iprights.pdf; David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure and Technological Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 193 (1986).
177. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
1293 (1996) (surveying the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, and arguing that repeat
players can and do come up with private solutions to overcome transactional
bottlenecks).
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vate rather than public ordering.178 The current debate over the
role of regulators in limiting the royalty rates and other terms
of private standard setting organizations provides a nice illustration of the debate over public versus private ordering.179 Opportunities also arise for experimentation with new types of
governance structures better adapted to the needs of particular
transactions—such as different ways of separating ownership
and control and new forms of public-private partnerships
adapted to address particular kinds of market failures.180
5. Institutions of Resource Allocation and Employment
Much of the traditional study of patent law and innovation
has taken place at this level, the continuous adjustment of
market participants to price and quantity signals as they optimize objective functions—production functions, typically, in the
context of firms. This level encompasses the study of how
changes in marginal conditions such as patent scope and patent
term length or the expected value of a resulting inventionproduct will alter decisions about activity levels in the production and use of inventions.181 The tools of optimization theory
provide useful avenues for exploring market adjustments in response to changes in rules or their enforcement.182 However,
the decision-makers are operating subject to bounded rationality, and their allocation choices are constrained by the combination of rules and their mechanisms for enforcement. Understanding in more detail how markets adjust, and the costs
associated with such adjustments, is a critical missing link
both in enriching traditional optimization models, and in deep178. See Williamson, Human Actors and Economic Organization,
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA 3 (1999) (It.) (citing Douglass C. North,
Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 7 (1984)).
179. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, & Daniel F. Spulber, The
FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming Mar. 2012).
180. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Opening the Black Box of Innovation, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 701, 703–08 (1994) (describing the R&D process
as including creators, financiers, owners, and users of the invention and
endogenizing the governance of R&D and distribution of investments, patent
rights, and profits among the actors to explore organization of R&D).
181. Williamson, supra note 75, at 597.
182. See, e.g., Arthur B. Treadway, Adjustment Costs and Variable Inputs
in the Theory of the Competitive Firm, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 329 (1970) (discussing the economic affects adjustment costs have on competition).
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ening transaction cost theories of patent law.183 An important
related area of empirical work lies in finding ways to identify
and measure transaction costs, including a comparison of
transaction costs relating to innovation activities in the presence and absence of patents.
6. Putting the Levels Together
Taken together, these levels and the interaction between
them can be used to characterize the institutional environment
within which different policy parameters can be studied, and
this provides a framework within which policy choices can be
evaluated and compared. The figure below provides an illustration of this framework.184

183. See Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to PaL.
REV.
(forthcoming),
available
at
tent
Reform,
ALA.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521137 (to access article, select One-Click Download); see also Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets, supra note 100 (discussing the role of private markets in shaping the limits on patent rights); Merges, supra note 15.
184. See Eva Lieberherr, Policy Relevance of New Institutional Economics?
Assessing Efficiency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 5–7 (Ecole Polytechnique
Fédérale de Lausanne, Working Paper No. 0906, 2009), available at
http://mir.epfl.ch/files/content/sites/mir/files/users/181931/public/wp0906.pdf,
for a further discussion of these levels.
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Figure 1: Characterizing The Institutional Environment
Adapted from Williamson185
Layers
Objectives
Pace of
Change
Cognition

Influence risk taking, entrepreneurship

↓↑

Spontaneous

Very slow

Limited opportunity for regulation

Embedded
Institutions

Limited opportunity for regulation

Informal rules such as norms,
values, and culture

Importance of norms and norm
building
Long term development of institutional
capacity

↓↑

Institutional
Environment

Formal rules: rules of the game.
Examples: patent rights, property
rights

↓↑

Institutional
Arrangements

Governance structure: play of the
game. Example: vertical integration

↓↑

Institutions of
Resource Allocation

Get institutional environment right
(changing the rules)

Very slow

Moderate

Opportunities for policy intervention
through rule change

Get governance structure right
(changing governance structure)
Opportunities for policy intervention
relating to choice and function of
governance structures

Moderate

Get marginal conditions right

Rapid

Opportunities for intervention: traditional demand and supply strategies,
regulation directed at incentives and
market failure

For the policy-maker, several important points emerge
from this framework. First, the layers are interconnected.
Changes made at any layer will influence the effect of other institutions. For example, formal rules may determine what
types of governance structures are feasible. The effectiveness of
changes may also be muted by other layers. For example, a rule
185. Williamson, supra note 144, at 26.
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change designed to alter the ease of challenging a patent will
have little effect if there are factors at the first level of analysis
that constrain patent challenges, or if there are factors at the
third level that make enforcement prohibitively expensive. The
interaction between the mechanisms and the availability of
multiple policy levers also suggests the need for policy coordination. For example, USPTO strategies for changing the relationship between the agency and patent applicants to encourage higher quality submissions need to be examined alongside
proposed legislative changes, such as rules governing inequitable conduct. A formal rule change may have no effect on behavior if the behavior is controlled by strong norms that point in
the other direction. Second, the relative importance of different
layers for achieving desired changes in economic behavior will
vary depending on the characteristics of the behavior and the
specific institutional context in which it takes place. Changing
risk-taking behavior or beliefs about entrepreneurial ability
may be most heavily influenced by efforts at cognitive change
and a change in norms, whereas increasing the ability of companies to specialize may be primarily a matter of the interaction of formal rule change with governance structures. Third,
the policy tools and the opportunities for change vary significantly by level, with little scope for change at layer one and an
opportunity for rapid and potentially significant change at layer five. Empirical studies are needed to determine which mechanisms predominate in different types of economic behaviors
and thus, which policy variables are most likely to be effective.
IV. APPLICATIONS
This Part illustrates how the organizational approach
works as a guide for patent law change through some examples
that highlight areas in which the patent system is underperforming.
A. MAKING PATENT POLICY RELEVANT TO NATIONAL
INNOVATION POLICY
Organizational innovation works in combination with
technological innovation, and as technologies change, so do the
organizations which develop and use these technologies.186 The
186. Chandler’s work on the emergence of new organizational forms points
to the importance of organizational innovation working in tandem with technological innovation. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND
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organizational approach to patent law evaluates patents in
terms of their ability to support efficient forms of economic organization. This includes responding to changing modes of organizing innovation. Pursuant to this approach, patent policymakers are asked to start with the goal of facilitating alternative processes of innovation, and to investigate what roles patents are or might play in determining the cost and feasibility
of these alternative processes.187 As already discussed, the organization of economic activities plays an important part in
Obama’s National Innovation Strategy. By focusing on objectives that are driving the U.S. national innovation strategy,
and by explaining how patents can help to achieve these objectives, patent policy can play a more central and effective role in
innovation policy.188 Not only will it be easier to integrate patent policy into broader decision making about innovation, but
it will also be harder to justify political barriers which keep patent policy decision-makers out of the discussion.189
Consider, for example, the role of patent policy as part of
President Obama’s energy innovation strategy. One key result
of the National Innovation Strategy and the policy initiatives it
has prompted is increased government spending, particularly
in key sectors such as clean energy and health technologies.190
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 309–
15 (MASS. INST. OF TECH. ED., 1962).
187. Inroads in connecting patents to the structure of innovation have already been made. Merges, for example, examines the development of hybrid
institutions formed to address transaction cost and valuation problems inherent in the reallocation of intellectual property rights that are necessary to create workable markets. See Merges, supra note 177 (applying NIE to case studies of performing rights societies, patent pools, and the Hollywood Script
Registry in order to examine the institutional innovations that are designed to
address challenges of creating collective rights mechanisms). Barnett examines whether markets will select intellectual property regimes most conducive
to innovation. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384 (2009). Murray and
Huang discuss the potential for policy experiments in funding innovation. See
Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Entrepreneurial Experiments in Science Policy: Analyzing the Human Genome Project, 39 RES. POL’Y 567 (2010).
188. Rai has been arguing for a coordinated innovation policy. Benjamin &
Rai, supra note 25.
189. The absence of patents in national innovation strategies could be accounted for in political economy terms. Recognizing patents as critical tools of
innovation would require a shift in authority and resources that many in the
current government structure would be reluctant to make.
190. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 28 (2010) (discussing clean energy economy); NAT’L
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In addition to increased funding, the USPTO implemented a pilot program for green technologies that is designed to expedite
the processing of patent applications relating to clean energies.191 A simple incentive-based approach to patent law would
suggest that increased funding of private sector R&D and faster processing of patents would together increase the speed and
volume of development and deployment of green technologies.
Applying the organizational approach, however, shifts the
starting point of analysis to alternative ways of organizing efforts to develop and deploy green technologies.192 Transactions,
such as the agreements between private parties in a patent
pool or contracting arrangements between research entities
and industry partners, are the units of analysis; the effects of
alternative patent laws on the cost and feasibility of different
transactions are examined. Using this approach, the effectiveness of the USPTO program is evaluated in light of the most
promising models of innovation, including attention to patent
pools and patent commons.193 When viewed from this perspective, increasing the speed and likelihood of patenting might
hinder rather than enhance these relationships. In addition,
the ways in which public funding is provided and the ownership of publicly funded inventions need to be considered. Existing NIE work points to the importance of examining incentives
of public and private actors in light of default ownership

ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2 (identifying clean energies as one of the sectors
identified for intervention).
191. Green Technology Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified Oct. 5,
2011); see, e.g., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., WHITE HOUSE ENERGY
INNOVATION CONFERENCE: SUMMARY REPORT 10 (2010), available at
http://www.energyinnovationnetwork.org/en/~/media/Files/WH_summary_rep
ort.ashx (This report discusses the White House energy innovation agenda,
which includes the USPTO pilot program to expedite processing of patent applications covering clean energy technologies under the assumption that
“[p]roviding innovators with more timely patent protection will help bring
technologies to market more quickly.”).
192. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. (calling for $190 billion to develop clean energy technologies).
193. See alternative models for sharing innovation such as the Eco-Patent
Commons established by IBM, Sony, Nokia, and Pitney Bowes. See Eco-Patent
BUS.
COUNCIL
FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.,
Commons,
WORLD
http://www.wbcsd.org/web/epc (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). Alternative models
also can be found at the GreenXchange hosted by Creative Commons. See Patent Licenses, SCI. COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/patentlicenses (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
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rules.194 It provides the tools to explore how a changing balance
of public and private activity may alter innovation processes.195
Getting the balance of public and private ownership right
might be critical to supporting organizational innovation and
preserving both private sector incentives and widespread access to fundamental discoveries.196
Another key finding from national innovation studies is the
need for public involvement in the formation of “clusters” or
“networks” of innovation, including universities, private laboratories, and access to funding and other forms of support for new
businesses.197 If regional industry clustering is the goal, we examine whether stronger or weaker patent rights support this
clustering. We know already that patents allow for more decentralized forms of production and may enhance certain kinds of
information sharing.198 Where there is a more pervasive role for
public actors as not only funders but also consumers and users
of innovation, we examine the costs and benefits of the existing
194. See generally Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The
Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 101 (2010) (exemplifying various public incentives and economic theories
at play in the antibiotic market, and the impact this has on pharmaceutical
innovation and development).
195. See, e.g., Sean O’Connor, Controlling the Means of Innovation: The
Centrality of Private Ordering Arrangements for Innovators and Entrepreneurs, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH (Robert Litan ed.,
2011).
196. Kevin Outterson offers an interesting example of the importance of
the structure of the innovation process in his study of antibiotics. See Kevin
Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance
in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2010). He shows that
strengthening patent rights in the market for antibiotics may lead to overuse
of antibiotics, with significant consequences for antibiotic resistance and incentives to develop new antibiotics. Id.
197. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as
Part of A Full TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2009);
see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 190, at 22 (including a discussion of a shift towards cluster policies in innovation); NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION FY 2011 BUDGET REQUEST TO CONGRESS, at
Overview-4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/
fy2011/pdf/FY%202011%20Budget%20Request%20to%20Congress.pdf
(discussing the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) plan to invest $12 million to
promote new “NSF Innovation Ecosystems” with support for regional innovation clusters around universities to increase the impact of innovation through
commercialization, industry alliances, and start-up formation).
198. See generally Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1651–55 (explaining the
benefits that a decentralized model will have for patent law).
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allocation of ownership rights provided by patent laws such as
the Bayh-Dole Act, with its allocation of ownership rights to
private research institutions.199 The one specific effort to address the increase in collaborative research and development in
patent law may have created more problems than it solved because it failed to address the underlying structural challenges
of different kinds of collaboration. This effort, the Cooperative
Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004,
sought to foster collaborations between public and private actors by allowing exchanges of information in a way that increased the ability of each party to patent the results.200 While
seemingly a benefit to public-private partnerships, a failure to
consider the transactional structures of university-private
company negotiations and the scope for opportunistic behavior
by private parties resulted in rules that could systematically
disadvantage the university partners.201
B. TAILORING THE CASE FOR TAILORING
The U.S. patent statute creates a set of rules of general applicability which are to be applied to provide technology-neutral
protection to any inventions that satisfy the legal standards
prescribed.202 This fits well with traditional approaches to patents and invention, with their abstraction from the processes
of innovation. The one-size-fits-all approach is increasingly at
odds, however, with evidence that patents perform differently
in different market and non-market contexts. Additionally, patent law has not yielded the hoped for flexibility in addressing

199. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 reflect U.S. patent law efforts to facilitate innovation in
contexts of government-funded research, by non-government research entities.
See 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006). The effectiveness of these
laws is still under debate. See F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent
Policy Reform in the United States 18 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working
Paper No. RWP07-042, 2007) (suggesting alternatives to the current patent
law regime).
200. The Act expands the universe of information that will not be considered prior art when seeking patent protection for the fruits of the collaboration. See, e.g., Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE)
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–453, 118 Stat. 3596 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103(c))
(protects information shared as part of a collaboration from being considered
prior art for patenting purposes); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 200
(2006) (providing for ownership over inventions developed using federal funding).
201. See Vertinsky, supra note 183, at 68.
202. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1576.
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changing technological and business needs.203 Patents are seen
as working well in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries,
for example, and poorly in the software and other related high
tech industries.204 They are seen as working well in privately
funded, purely commercial projects and less well in areas of research receiving significant public support.205 Patents covering
single products are less worrying than patents covering platform technologies used in producing multiple goods. Patents
may serve functions early in the development process but fail to
address the challenges of commercialization.206
Many commentators have advocated a tailored approach to
patent law, through the policy levers available to courts, tools
available to the USPTO, or through legislative efforts.207 Proposals that have been prominent in the patent literature include the recommendations made by Dan L. Burk and Mark A.
Lemley in “The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve It.”
Burk and Lemley make the argument that patent law should
be, and in practice often is, tailored to specific industries and
technologies, based on the argument that different industries
innovate differently.208 To the extent that industry differences
align with characteristics of different processes for innovation,
and alternative forms of tailoring are not feasible, industry tailoring may be an appropriate guide for policymakers. Opportu-

203. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09.
204. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09; Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Policy, supra note 22, at 1675–95.
205. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation?: The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998);
Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incetive or Double Subsidy? (forthcoming), available at
http://publish.uwo.ca/~strosow/Sabo_Bill_Paper.pdf.
206. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–08 (2001); Sichelman, supra note 19, at 5–6 (arguing that patent law as an inducement to invent does
not sufficiently capture the incentives needed for further commercialization).
207. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22 (pointing to policy levers and
the fact that patent law is applied in different ways in different industries, but
not necessarily through a reasoned approach).
208. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 25, at 109–65 (arguing that
courts can use existing policy levers to achieve a tailored patent approach that
is responsive to the needs of different industries and technologies); see also
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 106–09 (concluding that patents work
well as property in some fields of technology and some industries some of the
time).

6 VERTINSKY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH

2/27/2012 2:20 PM

259

nities for more refined strategies should be explored.209 These
strategies need to encompass evolving innovation paradigms
and the multi-faceted nature of innovative activity.210 They
need to respond to multiple innovative communities, including
commercial firms, scientific researchers, user innovator communities, and open source proponents.211
I suggest that disagreement persists about the type and
level of tailoring of patent law that should occur in part because
explanations of how patents change innovation are inadequate.
By targeting the organization of innovation as the focus of patent policy, the organizational approach offers a coherent
framework for examining ways in which patent law should be
tailored to fit different contexts.212 A central premise of the organizational approach is that patent law should be designed in
light of and be tailored to the distinct needs of alternative innovation processes. Selection among alternative approaches
should be informed by factors such as information asymmetries, the nature and specificity of investments required, the
importance of informal rules in shaping relationships among
participants, and the structure of the markets within which
such activities take place. Moreover, patent law needs to be responsive and adaptable to emerging modes of innovation. In
some cases, such as the evolution of standard setting organizations to address the coordination needs of related technologies,
this may mean limiting regulation to provide greater opportunities for private ordering, but with some protection against

209. Carroll, for example, advocates a pragmatic, evidence-based economics
approach to tailoring measures, which takes into account information costs
relating to who can pick the winning technologies and the cost and political
feasibility of tailoring measures. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
1361, 1410–1414 (2009) (advocating for a pragmatic, evidence-based economics
approach as basis for selecting among tailoring policies. Factors include questions of who has the best information, costs of administering the system, and
considerations of political economy).
210. While innovation and economic growth are sometimes referred to almost interchangeably as desired outcomes of the patent system, for example,
innovation is only one factor in economic growth and does not always result in
what we might think of as economic growth. There may also be non-economic
objectives or values to address, such as issues of equity and a transformational
impact of certain kinds of property rights, which need to be captured in the
analysis of patent policy.
211. Strandburg, supra note 44, at 867.
212. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1578.
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opportunistic behavior.213 In other cases, such as the search for
vaccines in the face of a potential public health emergency, it
may mean recognizing and accommodating a broad government
role in the innovation process. Recent work documenting the
prevalence and importance of alternative systems of innovation
highlight the importance of unpacking the concept of innovation and recognizing the institutional context within which different forms of innovation take place and the resulting implications for patent policy.214
The framework offered in Part III provides a useful starting point in exploring when and how patent laws might have
differential effects that should be addressed through a change
in patent law or how it is interpreted and applied. At the most
basic level, there may be a cognitive, behavioral or psychological aspect to the choice of property right system that selects for
or against certain modes of innovation.215 The availability of
private ownership rights may create a tipping point, transforming systems of open collaboration into systems of proprietary
ownership and use, once assets become more valuable. Free
rider problems may limit the ability to form open collaborative
innovation communities without some ability to pre-commit to
participation. Interesting questions include how the presence of
patents changes the ways that innovators think about collaborating and how it alters the relationships between members of
collaborations. Where the understanding and interpretation of
patent law involves conceptions of fairness and empowerment,
213. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Conference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Working Paper, Nov. 13,
2004,), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661543
(to access article, select One-Click Download).
214. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 146; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059 (2008); Michael J. Madison, Brett M.
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); Strandburg, supra note
44, at 904–05.
215. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104
NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1484–92 (2010) (looking at the difference in standards for
protectibility in patent and copyright law from the perspective of the psychology of creativity and creation, and emphasizing the aspects of problem solving
and the ability to embrace newness in scientific and engineering inventions).
Fromer also suggests that the law needs to address how to treat protected
forms of creativity that do not fit the archetype of creativity for the relevant IP
regimes. Id.
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for example, and where norms for flexible use of and respect for
patent rights emerge, the formal institution of patent law may
become more effective as a tool for innovation. Similarly, where
the system is regarded as exploitative or inefficient, or norms
develop which involve ignoring intellectual property rights, the
effectiveness of the patent system may decline. Examples of patent law research beginning to take place at this level include
the study of how norms of information production and information sharing develop and interact with formal rules, such as
the allocations of property rights.216 Studies of creativity and
processes of scientific discovery can suggest characteristics that
may usefully inform the construction of patent laws.217
Informal rules—level two of the framework—play an important role in the development and dissemination of
knowledge, and in the interaction of norms of “free” or “semifree” information sharing with patent law; this is a subject of
growing concern, particularly in the context of academic science.218 Alternative modes of innovation emerge that are constructed around norms of open access. Consider, for example,
user innovators—or lead users—who develop technology for
their own use, and are involved in free innovation transfers.
These “lead users” innovate in order to solve their own ahead of
market needs, providing new and improved products, often
without any intent or action to patent their contributions.219

216. This has been the subject of much discussion in the context of patent
rights obtained over the fruits of basic research. See Robert P. Merges, A New
Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 197 (2004) (discussing concerns about the “propertization” of the public domain); see also Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, supra note 35.
217. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 215.
218. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217–26 (1987) (discussing the conflict between exclusive rights in research discoveries and academic
norms); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 698; Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 145 (1996).
219. See Fred Gault & Eric von Hippel, The Prevalence of User Innovation
and Free Innovation Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and Innovation Policy at 3 (MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4722-09,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337232 (to access article, select
One-Click Download) (arguing that statistical indicators of innovation activities should be modified to reflect the importance of user-innovators in producing product and process innovations and that given the significance of this
“free” innovation we should be more skeptical about the need for strong patent
rights).
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User innovator communities are often characterized by a “free
revealing” of their innovations with others in response to private benefits that they can obtain as a result, such as recognition, adoption of certain generally available technologies, or the
exchange of contributions from others.220 The informal rules
which sustain free revealing may override, or come into conflict
with, formal rules of ownership over the information. In “open
source” software development projects, contributors commit to
make their contributions available for duplication and use
without charge.221 Patents may serve to undermine certain
types of innovation structures by interfering with norms of information sharing. Alternatively, they may strengthen the systems by creating mechanisms for enforcing the sharing of information, like through open source licensing. As an example,
the open source model of software has managed to co-exist with
proprietary software ownership and, indeed, has utilized intellectual property rights to formalize and perpetuate the open
source model through license agreements such as the General
Public License.
Focusing on levels three and four of the framework, the existing literature suggests that the connection between patents
and market structure is critical.222 Industry-specific studies,
and applications of industrial organization to the study of patents and innovation—in particular market structures—move
in the right direction. Examples include the study of industries
where standard setting is important and where technological
progress is characterized by incremental, cumulative innovation.223 The organizational approach to innovation connects in220. See Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from
Open-Source Software, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 84, 85 (2001).
221. See, e.g., James Bessen, What Good is Free Software?, in
GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 14–18 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., 2002).
222. Attention is increasingly directed towards theories of patents and
market structure, spurred by the work of Lemley, Merges, Barnett, and others. Overall patent scholars have been much slower than anti-trust scholars to
turn their attention to issues of market structure and the organization of innovation.
223. E.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemary Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001) (conducting interviews of
industry representatives and analyzing the industries patenting behavior);
Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Policy, supra note 22, at 1619–24 (citing examples from different industries).
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dustry-specific and technology-specific studies and models to
inform proposals for a more tailored approach to patent policy.224 The effectiveness of patents in furthering desirable forms
of economic behavior depends on a variety of factors. Examples
offered by the existing patent literature, particularly NIEbased work, include differences in the levels of investment
needed to develop technologies and the risks of appropriation,
differences in licensing costs in different markets,225 relative
costs of increased incentives to pioneer inventors versus the
costs of impeding incremental improvers,226 and industryspecific factors that allow for patents to perform better or worse
as property rights.227 Norms can also play a role in influencing
what types of collaborative practices are considered.228
The organizational approach offers a way of incorporating
these different factors into patent policy design because it looks
at the organization of innovation with the recognition that efficient organizational form will be context dependent. In moving
away from a uniform patent law, however, we need to consider
whether selection between paths of innovation is an appropriate domain for patent lawmakers. As North reminds us, institutions are inherently imperfect. They are subject to the ideas,
ideologies, and interests of those who govern. How much government intervention do we want in selecting for or against alternative forms of innovation? Decisions about the nature of
the tailoring must also be made in light of the costs of administering such detailed rules and the limitations of both decisionmakers and implementers of the rules. A slightly different but
equally important policy implication is that the government is,
whether directly or indirectly, selecting for or against certain
kinds of innovation through patent policy.229 In certain coun224. See, e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 222, at 101; Peter Lee, Towards
a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 924–25; Fiona
Murray, The Stem Cell Market: Patents and the Pursuit of Scientific Progress,
356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2341, 2343 (2007).
225. See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 120, at 62–65 (arguing that
the ideal design of an intellectual property system depends on the ease with
which rights holders can enter into licensing and other contractual arrangements involving these rights).
226. See id. at 68.
227. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 91–94.
228. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2169, 2169 (2009) (discussing the focus of universities on narrow licensing
practices and the need to explore broader forms of collaboration in their technology transfer practices).
229. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 221, at 26–32. See also Rebecca S. Eisen-
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tries, such as China, there have been considerations of whether
government users should be required to use open source technologies.230 The selection can be implicit in patent policies that
do not take into account the selective effect of the rules on different types of innovation. While recognizing the dangers of a
government-driven system of innovation and the advantages of
a decentralized innovation policy, we need some way of evaluating whether regulatory approaches are effectively targeting the
most beneficial activities and addressing the multiple goals
that the institutions are designed to serve.231 Focusing on the
intersection of rules and organization provides the framework
within which such a discussion can take place.232
C. THE NEED FOR ROBUSTNESS AND THE SECOND BEST RULE
A key implication of the organizational approach and its
underlying assumptions about economic behavior is that patent
laws should be designed with the expectation of opportunistic
behavior and should be robust to the consequences of such behavior. This means that patent laws should be designed in light
of propensities for over-patenting, the abuse of continuations,
and patent trolling, taking into account the positive and negative effects of such behavior on the cost and feasibility of different modes of innovation.
Opportunistic behavior can arise when contracts are neces-

berg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem
Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21 1187 (2006) (illustrating the importance of the intersection of public funding and patent policy regarding publicly funded inventions in shaping innovation outcomes).
230. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing:
Open Source and Beyond, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 111 (2005).
231. See, e.g., Madison et al., supra note 214, at 659 (examining the intersection of IP and its interactions with other legal and social mechanisms of
governing creativity and innovation through the study of intellectual sharing/pooling arrangements and the construction of cultural commons arrangements); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 579–81 (2006).
232. Key questions to inform this analysis include: What is the relative importance of different types of innovation and how, if at all, should patent law
respond? To what extent do patent laws select for or against different types of
organizations, such as joint ventures, collaborations, and small versus large
firms, and does this matter for innovation outcomes? When will private actors
adapt their modes of innovation to neutralize the effects of patent law?
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sarily incomplete or information is imperfect.233 The potential
for costly opportunism is particularly severe where assetspecific or relationship-specific investments are required in the
face of imperfect information and high transaction costs. Patent
laws should therefore be designed to reduce situations of incomplete, particularly asymmetric, information, and to reduce
the cost and uncertainty of establishing the boundaries of patent rights. A number of patent reform proposals that have received attention by commentators and policy-makers can be explained and justified in light of this approach.
For example, the organizational approach provides a justification for Lemley’s and Kimberly A. Moore’s proposal to restrict the ability to file continuation patent applications, which
allow patent applicants to abandon and re-file applications or
to keep applications on file while pursuing related applications
on the same invention.234 Continuations can create problems
such as introducing delay and uncertainty for competitors because they must guess about pending claims, obtaining broader
patents due to persistence rather than merit, and using of strategic practices of drafting claims that cover competitor products
or surprising established producers who are unaware of the
pending application.
The organizational approach similarly supports James
Bessen’s and Michael J. Meurer’s call for improving the notice
function of patents by increasing the transparency of the patent
process and the predictability and visibility of patent boundaries.235 These efforts help to increase the information that economic actors have before they make project-specific or relationship-specific investments and improve the ability of patents to
perform effectively as property.
The organizational approach is of particular assistance in
guiding responses to patent trolling, since the practice involves
233. See Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 144, at 30–
31.
234. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 64–66 (2004) (describing the harm caused by
abuse of continuations practice and proposing restricting, or even abolishing,
continuation practice).
235. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 22, at 7 (“The economic effectiveness of
any property system depends not just on what it sets out to do, but also on the
laws, regulations, institutions, and norms that implement the system.”).
Bessen and Meurer also argue that an effective property system must improve
the implementation of patent laws in a way that satisfies the notice requirement of property rights. Id. at 235–36.
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an analysis of the transactional structures of patent owners
and patent users and the transaction costs of asserting patents
against producers of existing goods. Level three and four of the
framework encompass many of the tools for unpacking this
type of strategic behavior and its implications for organizational and market structure. Patent trolling is often used to describe the opportunistic enforcement of patents against infringers—generally with no intention to manufacture or market the
patented invention—with the hope of extracting licensing fees
that exceed the contribution of the invention to the user. Concerns about patent trolls have fueled some of the most significant proposed changes to the patent statute and have elicited
strong reactions from the courts.236 Rather than viewing such
behavior as abhorrent, the organizational approach suggests
that such behavior is to be expected and may even serve the
function of enabling secondary markets and increasing asset
liquidity.237 Attention then focuses on if, when, and how such
behavior impacts transaction costs and transactional structures
in the areas where opportunities for trolling arise, and how to
reduce those costs through rule change. The organizational approach supports measures that increase the visibility and
transparency of patent rights, reducing the asymmetries in information that patent “trolls” capitalize on. Similarly, the organizational approach supports proposals to include considerations of “contribution” of a patent to a product seeking to
address the patent hold-up problem. Although concerns do
arise over whether these “contributions” can be measured in an
accurate, or at least predictable, way. More careful analysis of
the use of injunctions in cases of patent infringement is also an
appropriate response, although the absence of a general consideration for market-wide effects of an injunction limit its effectiveness, making it a blunt instrument. As Robert Merges argues, use of injunctions can provide the type of institutional
adjustment that is needed to adapt patent rights to shifting

236. See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, RentSeeking and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1585–87
(2009).
237. See, e.g., id. at 1584–86 (examining how property rights systems can
lose traction with the underlying economic situations they govern and examining the challenges of rent seeking and the pressures it can put on innovation
and advocating institutional adjustments such as the eBay revision of standards for injunctive relief).
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economic conditions and their underlying transactional structures.238 Patent policy-makers must also be proactive in anticipating the behaviors of private actors who are seeking to maximize profits from their patent rights in evolving systems of
technology and business.
D. INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW: NORMS & COMPLIANCE
IP is essentially becoming the world’s currency of innovation. In this new environment, the global legal, economic, and
innovation communities bear the challenge and responsibility of
creating a market-based, stable exchange rate for the currency of
innovation by fostering greater understanding and respect for
IP.239
If intellectual property is the world’s currency of innovation, then an understanding of how international patent law
works, and how it connects with domestic patent law is critical
to effective patent policy. The emergence of the international
intellectual property framework complicates domestic U.S. patent policy. The two systems diverge in terms of how rules are
developed, applied, and enforced; the policies and policymakers shaping U.S. patent law have historically been different from those driving international patent laws and patent
policy. While domestic law relies on statutes and formal rules,
international law relies heavily on custom. Yet the two systems
increasingly intersect. They intersect on an administrative level through legal cases that have extra-territorial aspects and
through concerns about compliance of domestic laws with an
international framework. They intersect on a broader policy
level in light of the globalization of markets and innovation
processes. Traditional approaches to patent law, with their abstraction from the institutional environment in which rules are
generated and enforced, and their primary focus on marketbased incentive theories, do not readily generalize to international law settings. Nor do they help us to explore the effects of
globalization on domestic patent law. As a result, domestic patent policy remains largely disconnected from international patent policy and the study of international patent law and policy

238. Id. at 1586.
239. David J. Kappos, Under Secretary, Speech to the National Bureau of
Economic Research at the National Press Club (Apr. 20, 2010) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2010/Remarks_Kappos_Economic_Resear
ch.jsp.
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remains under-theorized.240 The organizational approach can
provide a broader understanding of how international patent
law operates and how international rules might intersect with
domestic rules. Applying the approach suggests that international patent policy should include a broader role for international norm building; it should be informed by broad principles
of compliance that are sensitive to local norms and legal system
capacity. The approach supports recent proposals for organizational innovation in the form of administrative solutions to
some of the challenges of international patent lawmaking and
enforcement, as discussed below.241
The traditional starting point for thinking about international patent law is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which provides the dominant
formal legal framework for international patent law.242 TRIPS
is housed within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a rulesbased international environment which has the stated objective
of promoting international trade.243 TRIPS provides minimum
levels of protection that each member state needs to provide to
the intellectual property of other members. It also includes certain broad principles, including national treatment, mostfavored nation treatment, and the principle that intellectual
240. However, important contributions have been made. See generally
Margaret Chon, Substantive Equality in International Intellectual Property
Norm-Setting, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Daniel
Gervais ed., 2007); Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO and
Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187 (2009); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation, Development and Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in
Global Administrative Law (Inst. Int’l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 08-66,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1316925 (to access article, select One-Click Download); Strandburg, supra
note 44.
241. See Merges, supra note 216; see also Eisenberg, supra note 35.
242. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (establishing a
multilateral agreement creating minimum protection standards for various
forms of intellectual property among Member States).
243. See Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies
_e/casestudies_e.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (“[T]he WTO creates a
framework within which sovereign decision-making can unleash important
opportunities or undermine the potential benefits flowing from a rules-based
international environment that promotes open trade.”).
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property protection should “contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology.”244 This third principle in particular reflects the
fact that the TRIPS framework must accommodate countries
with very different needs and interests, and that its implementation should reflect normative concerns such as access to
health. Many of the proposals for international patent policy
change take the form of proposed changes to the TRIPS framework, such as efforts to build in expanded or restricted abilities
to use compulsory licensing and expanded or restricted definitions of patentable subject matter.245 The mechanisms for effecting change in the rules and their enforcement are complex
and go beyond simple law-making processes. Moreover, a
change in the rules doesn’t go very far in changing behavior, as
demonstrated by the relative lack of utilization of the compulsory licensing provisions fought for as part of the Doha Declaration.246 Finally, it is difficult to connect the changes proposed
at the international level with implications for domestic patent
law and domestic innovation.
The organizational approach moves us beyond the view of
international patent law as simply a system of formal rules and
towards a view of the system as a set of both formal and informal rules that are the product of the diverse relationships and
arrangements that shape the system’s development, adoption,
and economic impact. The organizational approach suggests
that a first step in more effective reform of international patent
law is to recognize the relative importance of informal rules in
international law-making, implementation, and enforcement.
Informal rules play a significant role in shaping international
law, and in determining how agreed upon rules are interpreted,
implemented, and enforced.247 A variety of actors, both public

244. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 242, at 1200.
245. See generally Gervais, supra note 197 (analyzing the TRIPS agreement, with particular emphasis on the impact intellectual property has on
economic activity).
246. See Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater
Flexibility and a Non-Justiciability Solution, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 743,
746–751 (2003).
247. See, e.g., Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Business Regulation in
Local Context, in A GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW IN ASIA 13–16 (Pitman B. Potter
& Ljiljana Biuković eds., 2008) (proposing a selective adaption paradigm
which addresses the implementation of international legal norms in the context of local culture and legal traditions).
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and private, participate in this process.248 As Dinwoodie notes,
the “shape of international intellectual property law is being
determined by the interaction of numerous components of the
system.”249 There are multiple participants in norm creation:
both domestic and international, public, and private. In some
cases the norms may conflict with each other or with the established rules. Tensions also exist between uniform international
norms and national autonomy.250 A second step is to recognize
the importance of limited institutional capacity in responding
to formal and even informal rule changes.251 Local practices,
regulatory infrastructure, and local cultural norms are important factors in determining compliance with both formal and
informal rules. The approach advocates concepts which take into account the limited institutional capacity of different countries and the different cultural and social norms through which
formal rules are filtered. Notions of compliance, which capture
both adoption of rules and the constraints on their implementation and enforcement, provide a useful conceptual framework
for analysis.252
Third, the organizational approach supports proposals for
innovation in the organization of law making and enforcement.
Current work in the interface of domestic and international patent law explores the need for mechanisms to accommodate national courts and national interests in international patent law
making.253 The administrative structure of international patent
248. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law
System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 205, 206 (2006).
249. Id. at 10.
250. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, supra note 240, at 95–96.
251. See, e.g., SAMUEL WANGWE ET AL., CASE STUDY FOR STUDY 9:
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN IP POLICY-MAKING,
ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT, UGANDA 12–14 (2002). (looking at the
challenges of developing and implementing an IP system in Uganda in light of
the obligations of the TRIPS framework).
252. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 247, at 12–13 (arguing that international
law can acquire a variety of local meanings that require an understanding of
the local history and culture in addition to knowledge of the domestic economy
and laws).
253. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1010–13 (2002) (examining how the system of international IP lawmaking is changing and discussing the need for mechanisms to enhance the role of national courts that
were historically largely excluded from lawmaking process); Graeme B.
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law becomes a central part of international patent policy under
this approach. Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie argue that the process
of international intellectual property law should be the primary
focus of attention, and that new administrative structures are
needed to guide the development of international intellectual
property law. Internationalization of intellectual property law
is seen as occurring quickly through the activities of multiple
participants and the impact of global trade and digital technologies. Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie call for the recalibration of the
balance between national and international norms through
careful choice of institutional structures and gathering of information needed to make choices about international patent
law fairly and consciously.254 “Organizations such as the WTO
and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) evolve in
response to the needs and interests of different stakeholders,
with implications for both rule development and rule enforcement.”255
E. PATENTS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The study of entrepreneurship and its determinants has
been largely confined to disciplines other than law. A large and
growing business literature supports the importance of entrepreneurship as a vehicle of economic progress and growth and
explores the determinants of entrepreneurship and the variables that contribute to the success and failure of new ventures.
But despite the importance of intangible assets in new business
ventures and the role of ideas and control over these ideas in
fueling entrepreneurship, the relationship between patents and
entrepreneurship has received little attention from patent
scholars.256 If we agree that entrepreneurs play an important
Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307, 307–08 (2000).
254. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, supra note 240, at 95–97 (examining the extent to which
TRIPs dispute resolution adequately accommodates the operation of each
member’s political economy as it relates to intellectual property lawmaking).
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L.
431 (2004) (examining the scope for domestic responses to public domain in
the face of international legal frameworks governing patent law).
255. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 248, at 207–10 (examining international norm creation by a wide range of institutions, both public and private,
and the implications for the future development of the international IP system).
256. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted M. Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Pa-
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role in driving innovation, then how patents influence entrepreneurial activities, the performance of start-up ventures, and
the structure and nature of entrepreneurial markets should be
an area of focus for patent policy-makers.257 The Berkeley Patent Survey is one of the few attempts to uncover the broader
relationships between patents and entrepreneurship, exploring
patenting behavior of a large selection of high technology entrepreneurs. The results suggest that the patterns and drivers
of patent-holding are industry and context-specific, with venture capital financing as an important variable in differentiating behavior.258 Evidence supports the assertion that patents
are used for strategic reasons such as improving bargaining positions in cross-licensing, as well as signaling reasons such as
securing early stage investment. 259 The cost of obtaining and
enforcing patent rights appears to be a significant variable.
Overall, the results suggest the importance of context in determining use.260 The organizational approach provides a way
of integrating the context and connecting empirical findings
such as these to determine how to encourage entrepreneurship
through patent law change.
By starting with the human arrangements that drive alternative processes of innovation, the organizational approach
acknowledges the importance of human agency in the process
of innovation. It allows for distinctions between different types
of economic behavior at the level of the individual, the organization, and the market. Where there are actors that seem to
play a particularly important role in driving innovation, the
characteristics of these actors and factors that facilitate or impede their actions become an important area of policy focus. Fotent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1070 (2008); Ted M. Sichelman & Stuart
J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 113 (2010).
257. For the importance of entrepreneurs as agents of change, see Douglass
C. North, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problems, in WIDER ANNUAL LECTURES 1, 7 (Mar.
1997),
available
at
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/annuallectures/en_GB/AL1.
258. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pamela Samuelson & Ted
M. Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1326–27
(2009).
259. See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 256, at 112–13 (presenting evidence as to why innovators patent their new technologies).
260. Id.
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cusing on cognition provides a useful context for exploring the
characteristics, motivations, and decision-making of the entrepreneur, with implications for how patents might influence behavior.261 There is at least anecdotal evidence that patents
could have an empowerment function.262 The notion that one
can “own” their own ideas and create valuable assets out of
their own intellectual efforts can encourage individuals to pursue their initiatives in a business world that they might otherwise feel was inaccessible. There is both a psychological component and a practical business component to the notion of
intellectual property as property that can be self-created, with
limited external resources. At the broader social level, cultural
and social understanding about patents and intellectual property ownership more generally could create a climate conducive
to entrepreneurship, just as the bankruptcy laws and the acceptability of failure has been thought to contribute to the willingness to engage in risky new ventures.263 General norms
about risk taking and historical practices of investment might
be influenced by patent policies, influencing at least the financing of entrepreneurial activities. The different psychologies of
creativity and scientific or technical invention may also justify
differences in formal rules.264 Recognizing the interaction between informal rules and formal rules, the organizational approach captures the potential of entrepreneurial acts and beliefs to shape the direction of innovation and influence the roles
that patents may play in innovation processes.265
261. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Jonathan Remy Nash & Staphanie M.
Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449 (2010); Jennifer W. Scangos,
Comment, Instinct and Rationality: An Evolutionary Approach to Intellectual
Property Law, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 65 (2010).
262. For anecdotal evidence, see the life and work of National Foundation
for Teaching Entrepreneurship founder Steve Mariotti. But see Torrance &
Tomlinson, supra note 143, at 135.
263. See generally Mike W. Peng, Yasuhiro Yamakawa, & Seung-Hyun
Lee, Bankruptcy Laws and Entrepreneur-Friendliness, 34 ENTREPRENEURSHIP
THEORY AND PRACTICE 517 (2009).
264. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (2010) (examining patent laws and copyright laws in
light of psychology literature on creativity and different aspects of the creative
processes for different works and inventions).
265. See, e.g., Sarah Kaplan & Fiona Murray, Entrepreneurship and the
Construction of Value in Biotechnology, 29 RES. IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORG.
107, 107–8 (2010) (“[T]he burgeoning literature on institutional entrepreneurship . . . argues precisely that neither the technology nor the institutional environment is fixed and that multiple actors with multiple goals . . . act to
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Most of the existing research connecting patents to entrepreneurship has focused on the roles patents might play in obtaining financing for new ventures. The relationships between
entrepreneurs, their employees, their financers, their suppliers,
and their customers can be usefully explored by looking at the
intersection of formal rules and governance structures. At the
pre-financing level, patents can serve an information function,
signaling the value of intangible assets and human capital to
potential funders in a way that facilitates the financial transaction.266 Patents can also facilitate financing of early stage ventures by providing investors with property rights over intangible assets.267 Post-financing, venture capital backed firms tend
to have higher patenting. This can be explained in terms of the
higher innovation levels of venture-backed companies (a plus)
or in terms of the short-term nature of venture capital strategies, with their interest in creating signals of market value to
allow for early exit.268
The organizational approach also provides opportunities to
tie in relevant research from other disciplines in order to refine
patent strategies to promote entrepreneurship. At the level of
the firm, the management, operations research, and organizational design literature offer interesting insights into the connection between organizational structure, information systems,
and knowledge generation and transfer, with under-explored
implications for patent law.269 Exploring firm structures that
shape the institutional setup that would govern activities in a particular
field.”).
266. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002)
(discussing patents as mechanisms for firms to signal their R&D capacity and
the value of their intellectual assets to attract financing and licensing opportunities).
267. See Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 1024–28.
268. See, e.g., Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert, Pehr-Johan Norbäck & Lars
Persson, Venture Capital Financing of Innovation, Patenting, and Long-Run
Performance of Private Acquisitions (Massey U. C. of Bus. Res., Working Paper
No. 13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1629226 (to access article,
select One-Click Download) (examining the relationship between venture capital financing, patent intensity, and firm performance in light of facts such as
the higher patent count of VC intensive industries, and also studying the incentive effects such as role of patents in signaling company value prior to exit).
269. The study of how firm structure influences knowledge management
offers an alternative entry point for studying characteristics of firms that are
successful innovators. See Richard Baskerville & Alina Dulipovici, The Theoretical Foundations of Knowledge Management, 4 KNOWLEDGE MGMT. RES. &
PRAC. 83, 90–92 (2006).
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are particularly effective, or ineffective, at producing and utilizing new technologies and investigating what role, if any, patents play in sustaining those structures may offer new insights into the impact of patent law on innovation. Theories of
knowledge management and spillover can be used to study the
interaction between incumbent firms and entrepreneurs in the
presence and absence of intellectual property rights.270 A particularly fruitful avenue for exploring the intersection of intellectual property and entrepreneurship lies in the study of organizational responses to opportunities and obstacles in
cumulative innovation. Examples include the study of how the
conditions surrounding the access and use of an innovation impact the ability of others to innovate cumulatively.271 Industrial
organization and game theory can help in exploring the effects
of changing market structures on entrepreneurship. The expansion of markets for technology may, for example, either enhance the development of new ventures by providing greater
access to new technologies with commercial potential, or reduce
it by pushing innovators to sell early to large purchasers rather
than accept the risk of self-development. Comparisons can be
drawn between the ability of big and small firms to innovate
and the potential costs of hierarchy and size in limiting entrepreneurial activity, and this can be tied to the roles that patents may play in allowing or impeding efforts to spin off ideas
and create new ventures or, conversely, to block the development of competing technologies.272 This type of research can be
used to provide the contextual framework within which to
reexamine the implications of existing studies within the pa270. See, e.g., Zoltan J. Acs, Pontus Braunerhjelm, David B. Audretsch &
Bo Carlsson, The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, 32 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 15, 15–19 (2009) (looking at the source of entrepreneurial opportunities and tying it to knowledge and ideas created in incumbent organizations, and suggesting that entrepreneurial opportunities are not exogenous
but instead systematically created by investments in knowledge); Zoltan J. Acs
& Mark Sanders, Intellectual Property Rights and the Knowledge Spillover
Theory of Entrepreneurship § I (Jena Econ. Res. Papers, Paper No. 2008–069,
2008), available at http://edoc.mpg.de/get.epl?fid=52283&did=399807&ver=0
(arguing that, up to a point, stronger IP rights may facilitate entrepreneurship, but at some point, expanding IP rights may dampen the incentives of entrepreneurs).
271. See, e.g., Fiona Murray & Siobhán O’Mahony, Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for Organization Science, 18
ORG. SCI. 1006, 1006–07 (2007); J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal
Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1743, 1744–45 (2000).
272. See generally Sichelman & Graham, supra note 256.
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tent literature.
Studies of the academic-firm interface offer important insights into roles that patents might play in science-based entrepreneurship. The role of academic scientists in the process of
creating and growing new ventures is particularly significant in
the life sciences, where much of the basic research underlying
drug discovery and development is conducted in universities
and other non-profit research labs. They participate in venture
creation and development through consulting, sponsored research, and other forms of collaboration that can involve transfer of both human and social capital.273 Patents offer mechanisms for structuring collaborations that might otherwise be
unavailable, but in allocating ownership and control over the
fruits of collaboration they might also foreclose certain types of
research and collaborative activity. Despite the importance of
these activities, the effects of science-based entrepreneurship
and, in particular, the roles of patents in promoting it, on the
conduct of academic science have yet to be fully understood.274
Policy implications uncovered by an organizational approach
include tailoring of patent policy to include broader research
use exemptions to distinguish between applied and basic research.275
CONCLUSION
Truly among man’s innovations, the use of organization to
accomplish his ends is among both his greatest and his earliest.276
In 2009 President Obama announced a new “Strategy for
Innovation” designed to “lay the foundation for the innovation

273. See, e.g., Fiona Murray, The Role of Academic Inventors in Entrepreneurial Firms: Sharing the Laboratory Life, 33 RES. POL. 643, 644 (2004) (examining the extent and mechanisms through which academic scientists contribute not only human capital but also social capital to entrepreneurial
firms).
274. Cf. Mark Edwards, Fiona Murray & Robert Yu, Gold in the Ivory Tower: Equity Rewards of Outlicensing, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 509, 515 (2006)
(“[T]he impact of startup involvement on scientific competition, the behavior of
academic scientists and the diffusion of publicly funded science to a wide audience has yet to be fully unraveled.”).
275. See generally Merges, supra note 41 (proposing broader research use
exemption).
276. KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 224
(1971).
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economy of the future,” and updated it in February 2011 to
build on key aspects of the strategy.277 The policy calls for
strengthening competitive markets through regulatory reform
and a rethinking of the relationship between public and private
sectors, for government intervention in key sectors where
“markets may fail on their own,” and for increased investment
in the basic infrastructure underlying systems of innovation.278
A key theme in the national innovation policy is the importance
of collaboration and the need to foster new and improved regional and local systems of innovation.279 The America
COMPETES Act, passed in 2007 and reauthorized in 2011,
emphasizes the use of organizational strategies to support innovation. These strategies include fostering new kinds of collaboration, particularly public-private collaborations such as
those between universities, government labs, and firms, and
supporting new forms of economic organization, such as the
creation of regional innovation clusters.280 Although the patent
system was created for the purpose of encouraging innovation,
patent policy is marginalized in current national innovation
strategies. This paper provides a way of answering this puzzle
and, more importantly, a way of making patent policy more relevant to innovation policy. I have argued that the neglect of patents as important tools in furthering the goals of national innovation strategies can be explained at least in part by the
focus of traditional approaches to patent policy on incentives to
invent rather than efforts to support innovation systems.
277. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at i; see also A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing Our Growth and Prosperity, WHITE HOUSE (Feb.
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/innovation/strategy.
278. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at ii (introducing a national innovation strategy built around government investment in key areas of innovation and in the infrastructure and other “inputs” of innovation and promotion
of competitive markets to produce the innovations needed, and advocating for
government intervention to support market production).
279. Id. at 19.
280. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, H.R. 5116, 111th
Cong. (2010) (investing in innovation through R&D and improving American
competitiveness); see, e.g. Robert D. Atkinson, Eight Ideas for Improving the
America COMPETES Act, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., March 2010, at
1, available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-america-competes.pdf; Fred Block
& Matthew R. Keller, Where Do Innovations come From? Transformations in
the U.S. National Innovation System, 1970-2006, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND., July 2008, at 1, available at http://www.itif.org/files/
Where_do_innovations_come_from.pdf (documenting the importance of collaborations between universities, federal labs, small firms, and large firms as
drivers of innovation).
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This Article has made the case for a reorientation of patent
policy to focus on the mechanisms through which patents alter
the nature and cost of transactions supporting systems of innovation. The organizational approach that I have proposed promotes the design of patent laws that are more narrowly tailored to the particular needs of alternative innovation
processes, focused on reducing the propensity for behaviors
which are most costly to the organization of economic activities,
robust to constraints on rule design and implementation, and
sensitive to alternative mechanisms for regulating behavior. By
adopting such an approach, policymakers can produce more effective strategies for patent policy design in real world settings
characterized by bounded rationality, market imperfections,
and constraints on efficient rule change. Existing applications
of New Institutional Economics to patent law have offered important insights into how patents impact the organization of
economic activities. But such efforts have thus far remained on
the sidelines in policy discussions, operating largely in isolation
from other theories and at a level that is either too abstract or
too descriptive to map readily into practical policy prescriptions
Recognizing that some level of abstraction from reality is essential in policy design, the organizational approach provides a
way of capturing critical features of real world innovation processes without losing analytical rigor and empirical testability.
It offers an opportunity for integrating existing patent theories
and empirical work in a way that can test the theories’ robustness and give them greater explanatory power, and it offers
new avenues for exploring different functions of patents that
may have been neglected or overlooked by mainstream approaches. Most importantly, it provides a way of demonstrating
the relevance of patents to key objectives of modern national
innovation strategies.
Significant challenges remain in this form of analysis.
Questions arise, for example, about how to apply an analysis of
transaction costs to dynamic systems of innovation in a way
that can be both modeled and measured, and about how to
identify the types of transactions and modes of organization
that will be most favorable to evolving systems of innovation.
Given the dynamic nature of innovation, institutions must constantly adjust if they are to keep pace in a rapidly changing society, but the ways of making institutions such as the patent
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system adaptively efficient remain the subject of continuing inquiry.281 Clearly the challenges facing effective patent policy
design are significant, and the value of the organizational approach that I propose remains to be proven by the effectiveness
of future concrete applications. I conclude, however, that the
organizational approach seems to be the most promising platform on which to pursue this challenging regulatory agenda.
Moreover, without such a shift in approach, critical opportunities to turn patents into effective tools of innovation will be
missed.

281. See North, supra note 60, at part VII (“It is adaptive rather than
allocative efficiency which is the key to long run growth.”).

